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JUSTICE, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION
JULIUS STONE*
G. TARELLO**

I. CONDITIONS OF FRUITFUL INQUIRY CONCERNING THE "MEANING" OF
JUSTICE

A. Linguistic Inquiries as to the Meaning of the Concept of "Justice"
If, as has been urged,' difficulties of human communication center
attention on basic concepts, it is right and proper that the search
for clarity about the concept of "justice" should have received high
priority in efforts to promote international understanding, such as
those of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization. 2 In order to promote "communication" and "understanding" elaborate studies have been entered upon to ask: "What
does 'justice' mean?" No one can doubt the earnest idealism or
devoted scholarship which have inspired both the planning and
execution of these studies of the meaning of justice. But this fact
only increases the importance of ensuring that methods of inquiry
should not be adopted which, instead of helping people to be clear
and improving "communication" and "understanding," in fact lead
to "solutions" which produce only additional obscurities.
The present interest, then, is in the concept of justice and in certain
methods of clarifying it. The methods under criticism pertain to the
role of language and especially syntax in explaining the meaning of
certain kinds of concepts, of which "justice" is an important example.
But it will be found that at least some of the conclusions to be drawn
have a bearing on the language of law as well as on that of justice.
The studies of "justice" above-mentioned were part of a general plan
launched in 1950 to examine words which are (a) important to com* LL.M. (Leeds), S.J.D. (Harvard), B.A., B.C.L., D.C.L. (Oxford).
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munication in a free world, and (b) used in different contexts with
suspected differences of meaning-coverage. Pursued independently by
scholars of different linguistic cultures, they were meant to fix the
meaning which these words have historically assumed in each different language. In the project on "Justice," five scholars, namely
E. Garin, L. Recasens Siches, G. Vlastos, Ch. Perelman and W. G.
Becker, provided papers dealing with "the meaning of the term and
its evolution within the context of the philosophical tradition" in
the Italian, Spanish, English, French and German languages respectively.3

In all the languages considered, "justice" is in a grammatical sense
the abstract noun corresponding to an adjective. In all the languages
considered, excepting German, both the noun and the adjective
derive from the Latin adjective and noun, "iustus" and "iustitia." In
Latin, the noun derived from a noun "ius," having a wider coverage
than the English "law." It is controversial whether the noun "ius"
originated as an adverbial form-the oldest texts seem to testify
that "ius" is only found in phrases such as "ius esto" or "ius est"where modern scholarship indicates that the usage of "ius" cannot be
patterned exclusively as either a noun, or an adjective, or an adverb
in the grammarian's sense.4 In German the connection between the
noun and the adjective is rather vaguer. First, there are there two
adjectives "'ichtig" and "gerecht"; second, the connections of
"Gerechtigke't" with "richtig" are not so strong and manifest in
German modern usage as in other languages. Both noun and adjective
in German are connected with a noun "Recht" which, as is commonplace, has an ambivalent reference to both "law" and "right." In turn,
this noun originated as an adjective, the original meaning of the
root-word of "recht" being "straight." It was the vulgar Latin "directurn" (diritto, derecho, droit, right) which early showed a tendency
to become a noun and to replace "ius" and its derivations in contexts
5
which now we would label as legal contexts.
3. The essays are printed in 41 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE

(1957).
4. Attention has been called to this by Orestano, Dal Jus al Fas, 46 BULLETIN DELL' IsTrTUTO DI DerrTo RomAxO 194 (1939); Elemento Divno ed Elemento Umano del Diritto di Roma, 21 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE Di FILOSOFIA
DEL DIRITTo 1 (1941). C]. Pisani, Fas e Jus, 33 ARcHxvo GLOTTOLOGICO ITALIANO 127 (1941); Goidanich, Fas e Jus: Concetti ed Etimi, 3 ATTI DELLA R.
AcCADEMIA D'ITALIA MEMORIE. CLASSE Di ScIENzE MoRALI, 499 (S. VII, 1943).
The latter has influenced the general thesis of M. Villey, op. cit. infra note 5.
5. The adjectival side of such a word has long been known. See, e.g., W.
CESARINI-SFORZA, "JUS" E "DIRECTUM" (1930); but for the present trend,
especially in France, to stress the adjectival side in order to analyze their
function, see ViLLEY, LECONS D'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT pt. I

(1958). His point is that we cannot describe law in terms of "rule" or
"norm" because it consists always of a set of adjectivations bearing elements

of justice. Villey, Une Definition du Droit [1959] ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU

Dnorr 47-65. Professor Villey supports his thesis by stressing usages of the
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B. Necessary Ambit of Linguistic Inquiries About Justice
The study of the range of meaning in different languages of roughly
correspondent abstract nouns, such as "justice," indissolubly connected with an adjectival function of an "evaluative" character,
entails a number of problems calling for stipulations as to the precise
ambit of the proposed inquiry. These problems arise from the structure of an adjectival function of the above character. To illustrate
these problems, we employ the symbol x to stand for "just" or its
corresponding term in another language. We employ symbols a, b, c,
to stand for particular descriptions of a course of action; corresponding
capital letters A, B, C, to stand for classes of courses of action of
which a, b, c, are respectively assumed to be members; the Greek
symbols a, 6, y, to stand for proper names (nouns) in the grammarian's
sense, and the same Greek symbols underlined for classes of men.
In these terms the following types of statements about justice may be
made:
Actions and Classes of Actions
(John Doe's yesterday's giving his friend Richard Roe
a is x
$100) was just.
A is x
(John Doe's giving his friends $100) is just (1).
(John Doe's giving his friends in state of need) $100 is just
(2).
(John Doe's giving his friends in state of need a sum of
money) is just (3).
(One's giving sums to one's needy friends) is just (4).
(One's giving sums to needy men) is just (5).
(One's giving support to needy men) is just (6).
Examples of "A is x" need not be further multiplied.

Y is x

7 is x

Men and Classes of Men
John Doe is just.
The Chief of the State (i.e., qua Chief of the State) is just.

Now the study of the range of "meaning" of the abstract evaluative
6
adjective x and of the abstract evaluative noun of the quality x-ness
divides itself up into the following different analyses:
1. Adjectivation in Terms of Just.-One is the analysis of what
term "droit" which are connected with the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition,
which (we point out) are nowadays found in common language, rather than
in lawyer's language.
We are not concerned in the present article with description of the legal
phenomenon, but only with what some verbal symbols for it are used to
do. It will reflect on Villey's positions (insofar as his ideas refer to whaz
law is) only as to his failure to distinguish between common language and
lawyer's language in modern times. On this see section IV infra.
6. We here use "quality" as the substantive of the adjective "x."
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x-ness is predicated of, or has been predicated of, in common language
and/or in one or several special, including technical, and "technicized"
(i.e., imperfectly technical) languages.7 This entails a set of researches of a historical semantic kind on the "meaning" of "just,"
the lexical meaning of "just" being the result of an analysis of the
sum-total of the contexts in which it has been and is employed. Such
researches are complex and divide themselves in turn into different
sub-researches.
Thus, the analysis of the propositions of the type "A is x," in
which the phrase which is the subject of the proposition contains
words which stand for classes (of actions or of men), requires
analyses of cultural processes, sometimes extremely complex. What
it may be just for a man to provide for his guests, as some supposed
Eskimo rules of hospitality may suggest, is a function of such
processes. The more abstract forms of this type (such as forms (4),
(5) and (6), in particular), are of the patterns of generalizations
inseparable from Weltanschauungen. These are the forms in which
"ideologies"-in our case the ideologies of justice-usually 8 organize
themselves.
But the analysis of what x-ness is predicated of, can also relate to
the 'y is x" (John Doe is just") kind of statement. Here the inquiry entails the analysis of the characters of particular men, or of
classes of men, who in a given culture are said to be x. They are
analyses, in short, of the historical modifications of the -Yor -Y who
is x. Adjectivations about a man as a whole in evaluative contexts
have become in some instances keywords of a determinate culture,
as "honngte-homme" in certain periods of French civilization. 9 They
7. For clarity in the following discussion we specify the meaning we
attribute to certain key terms. Special language: usage of a particular group
or class of persons. Scientific language:language where the terms are defined
and the rules of transformation of propositions are agreed. Technical
language: language where the terms are defined for the usage connected with
some skill or art or profession. Technicized language: language where some
but not all of the terms are defined for the usage of a skill or art or profession. Scientific languages, technical languages, and technicized languages are
all special languages. In the last section of this essay we shall refer to a special language used by a professional group and structured on a system of
(deductive) logic. Such a language is (a) special, (b) scientific (insofar as
it is structured on a system of logic), (c) technical (insofar as it is used
by a professional group). As will emerge in the last section, a special
scientific technical language need not be the only language used by
the professional group in question. For insofar as members of the professional group use undefined terms and transform sentences without predetermined rule, that part of their whole language is neither technical nor
scientific. This, of course, does not imply that it is bad, or that it is possible
for the group in question to speak only a scientific or technical language.
8. The connection between ideologies and the "A is x" form of expression
is not a necessary one. (In fact some ideologies have found expression in
is x" statements, such as "Hitler ist gerecht," and tended to be translated into
"Y is x" form such as "Der Fihrer ist gerecht.")
9. Such studies are cultivated by linguists with strong sociological interests,
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then become more and more "descriptive," but without losing their
evaluative character. To a smaller degree, all evaluative adjectivations about men tend in a determinate culture to become descriptive
to a certain extent; and to this "a just man" is no exception. It would
be easy to find statements in which such an expression is used as a
description of a person (in gross, as it were) although it would not
be easy to formalize a research in this field. Such usages are normally
connected with standards of convivance, of "live and let live," largely
conditioned by social and economic structures. 10
2. Translation of Adjective "Just" into a Substantive.-The second
and different analysis entailed by the problem of what "justice"
"means" is that of the transformations of the adjective into a substantive, the formation of a new adjective out of the substantive, and
the degree of synonomy between the two adjectives. And this would
have to include, essentially, factors. of modification involved in the
structure of a given language (but now in the sense of "tongue") as
associations of sounds, and "tendencies" (for instance to produce abstract nouns).
3. Translations between Adjectivations of Acts and of Men.-Still
a third and different analysis, also entailed, is the most complex of
all. It is the analysis of historical modifications of the reciprocal
relations of types of statement, for instance, like "a is x," "A is x,"
"y is x," and "y is x," with one another; and the analysis of the translations (as a matter of historical processes) of statements of one type
into statements of either of the others.
This third kind of research is so complex because it covers a combined field resulting from the interplay of the results reached in
the field of research (1.) and the field of research (2.). It covers, for
instance, the inquiry how far certain types of adjectivation of actions
in terms of justice in determinate cultures, historical periods, and
social conditions have controlled usage in later periods under different social and cultural conditions. So also usage in one language
may have to be studied for its influence on usage in another language,
through circulation of literature, translations, or personal contacts."

as G. MATORL, LE VOCABULAIRE ET

LA SOCIET

sous Louis PHILIPPE (1951)

and LA METHODE EN LEXcOLOGIE (1953). On key-words see the latter book,
at 67 passim, from which the example of the honn~te homme has been taken.
On this trend in historical semantics, to which belong also A.J. Greimas, B.
Quemada and P.G. Wexler, some account and bibliographical notice can be

found in S. ULLMAN, THE PRmcIPLEs

OF SEMANTIcs

312 passim (2d ed. 1957).

10. We may observe that such usages give arguments (although not generalisable and therefore not conclusive) to philosophical theories about the
descriptive nature of evaluations and imperatives.
11. Personal contacts, differently from circulation of literature and translations, affect not only the more educated classes (which provide diplomats,
travellers and merchants), but also the less educated classes (as in the
increasingly common cases of foreign armies settled for a time in a territory).
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This is the field where the circulation of religious and political
ideas is most relevant. It is well-known-and was an assumed basis
for the UNESCO project-that religious and political groups create
special usages in which common-language words assume different
(and sometimes widely different) connotations, and are thus creative
of breakdowns of communication. Educational patterns are another
source of special usages in a determinate tongue. Thus, the English
language, in general, seems to shun abstract nouns when adjectives
can be used; but some abstract nouns, among them "justice" and "the
rule of law," have become familiar, and have come to evolve independently from the related adjectives. One reason for such exceptions lies certainly in the fact that the Bible was for generations
the most widely-read book in English-speaking countries, and that
in the prevailing versions of it, the Bible speaks a language where
"law" and "justice" are significant in their substantive abstract form,
being related to God, whereas the adjectives generally refer not to
God but to men, and have therefore independent and different connotations.
The interplay of usages with which this branch of the analysis is
concerned creates shifts of meaning. For instance, a religious outlook furnishes a standard of approval, of "justice," according to which
determined types of actions are approved or just. We are on the level
of propositions "A is x." But suppose that the actions of the type
A are practiced, in a determinate society by the more influential
segment of the population, and that this part of the population for
some reason insists very much on its actions being x. Now suppose
also that for some reason the actions interpreted as being x are
courses of action favorable to the acquisition or retention of power by
the persons practicing them; and also that, for some reason, the men
of that segment tend to exclude from normal relationships those
elements of the community about whom it is not reasonably certain
that their actions will in future be x. In that case the x as referring
to the excluded individual is referred to a man, and we are confronted
with a translation (roughly speaking) from "A is x" to "y is x."
Such a translation, however, is not a true translation, for two
reasons.
Firstly, there would, in fact, be no men whose actions are all x,
such consistency being (happily or unhappily) not of this world.
Thus, to say "y is x" cannot be the same as saying: "All the actions
of y are A and therefore are x." In other words, to say that "y is x"
is not an elliptical form of speaking of a set of actions of the type A.
Necessarily, in order to reach ",I
is x," it is necessary to modify the
very value of x. If x was a rigid standard now it becomes an elastic
standard; the two standards are not really the same concept; for
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instance, the concept of "sinner" is not precisely reducible to the concept of "sin."
Secondly, in attributing a quality to a man as a whole, it is extremely likely that the quality will be modified by some features
which are not entailed by the quality when referred to an action or a
type of action, but by some collateral feature of the man. In the
exemplified hypothesis, it would be likely that other qualities, which
together characterize the group of the influential and powerful
members of the community, would enter into the process of excluding
a person from full membership. It is even possible that, in the long
run, the association of being x and being powerful in the group
might become so close, that in order to decide whether a person is
x, people may come to inquire whether he is powerful. Now, if the
power is simply the result of being recognized as x, such inquirers
are involved in circular reasoning, and they may be sent gravely
wrong by the line of inquiry. For while power here does create an
order, the order that they here see may be related not only to
actions A, but also to actions B, which are neutral with respect to
x, but relevant to the transmission of power, for instance through
heredity or through co-optation. In that case, a person might become
powerful, and yet be not x, even though he might have some interests which have the appearance of being x, in deference to the
order which entails that actions be approved actions. In this case,
then, a person deducing x from the presence of power may predicate
x of persons who are not really x in the original sense. Once this
practice becomes rather general, some theorist might well begin to'
theorize about x as a function of power, or of B, or of C actions.
The concept x still exists, but its "meaning" has changed.
All these different fields of analysis are involved in the enterprise
of clarifying terms like "justice," and they are all research in historical semantics. It is necessary to question the past, in order to grasp
the associations which in a particular time and place are attached
to a term, and to be able to establish in a reasonably warranted way
what our fellow-man-of-another-culture may be implying when he
uses such terms as "justice." It is clear that the UNESCO project was
undertaken without adequate preliminary specification and differentiation of such fields of analysis. A part of the purpose of this article
is to suggest the relation between this failure and the kind of results
reached in one of the most notable of the contributions, thus setting
the stage for the main problem indicated in the title.
C. "Meaning" of "Justice" and Common and Philosophical Usage
This, however, is not the only difficulty with the UNESCO project
under discussion. Not only was its ambit inadequate for achieving its
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stated purposes, but further examination also suggests that the research pursued was the wrong research to pursue for the stated purpose.
The stated aim of the research was to clarify the meaning of
"justice," as a word employed in common usage. The "first step" was
conceived as an analysis (1) by philosophers, (2) of the meaning of
justice in philosophical context, (3) under a scheme of division of
labor according to languages. This work-plan for "the first step" seems
subject to the following questions.
First, since the main philosophical usages are already sufficiently
well-known, why spend so much effort on them? 12 Second, since
philosophical usages tend to be the ones more 13 independent of common linguistic vehicles, how could they be a key to common usage?
Third, since, apart from philosophies which have become political
ideologies, philosophical usage is not even one of the most influential
among the usages, why does it call for such high priority? Fourth,
so far as concerns philosophies which have become political ideologies,
since their circulation generally transcends language borders, is not
the method adopted, of division of work according to languages, a
grave handicap? The fifth question arises from the fact that philosophical usage, besides influencing linguistic developments only little,
is also little influenced by common linguistic usage. Philosophers
often proceed rather by merely re-defining words for purposes of the
knowledge-system or (more recently) the methodological-system,
dropping segments of experience which do not fit, and contenting
themselves that the examination of what remains is to some purpose.
12. There is a sea of literature on conceptions of "justice" in particular
schools of thought, or in particular times or places, and there are books, in
which all the philosophical conceptions of justice from the Greeks to the
present purport to be recorded and classified. See, e.g., G. DEL VEccmo,
JusTicE, AN HISTORICAL AN] PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY (1952) (translation of 2d
ed. of 1946) and numerous works of Roscoe Pound, the latest his Jurisprudence, vol. 1, at 463-547. Of course scholarly research in this history of ideas
must go on, but it may be doubted whether a plan of research such as the
UNESCO project on "justice" stimulates fruitful research in the history of
ideas and of language, as distinct from merely turning over the existing heap
of knowledge or arranging that heap according to the planners' classification.
13. In particular cases the dependence may still be very great. Cf. the
much noted change of meaning or force of the German "Idealistic" vocabulary when translated into English, as compared with translation into French,
Italian or Spanish. But generally the effects of the respective linguistic
vehicles are greater in translation of common language terms than of philosophers' terms. The explicit Weltanschauungen of the philosophers, for
instance, communicates better than the Weltanschauungen implicit in a
tongue as a whole. Studies of these implicit Weltanschauungen are now
beginning. See L. WEISBERGER, VOM WELTBILD DER DEUTSCHEN SPRACHE (1954).
Comparative studies are still confined to linguistic cultures extremely remote
from one another. Cf. especially LANGUAGE, THOUGHT AND REALITY-SELECTED
WaRINGS OF BENJAMIN LEE WHOPR
STUDY OF LANGUAGE 43 passim (1953).

(J.B. Carroll ed. 1956); CARROLL, THE
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Whether such philosophies be systematical, methodological or ideological, their usage is thus consciously selective. How then can their
usage be of first importance for understanding common usage? Sixth,
in all these circumstances, it may be asked whether it is appropriate
to charge philosophers rather than linguists and historians of culture,
with the research involved. (Fortunately, in this particular project,
however, the philosophers concerned were all interested in the history of culture.)
D. The Meaning of "Justice" and the Philosophic Study of Language.
The above remarks on philosophical usages of words apply also, for
the most part, to philosophers and philosophies whose special concern is language. Many trends in modern philosophy are, of course,
concerned to analyze linguistic expression from different aspects.
First, they have considered the structure of linguistic expressions
to determine under what conditions a proposition can be said to be
true; linguistic expressions are here considered as means for dealing
with knowledge. 14 Second, such expressions may be considered as
to their function, to determine the conditions under which their
employment is correct; linguistic expressions are here considered as
a means of conveying information, even though the information may
not qualify as "knowledge" according to the more rigid verificational
tests.15 Third, attention has recently been given to linguistic expressions, still also in common language, as a means for conveying
emotions, and in particular that of "approval."' 16
14. We refer, generally, to the philosophical trends which analyze propositions as truth functions, such as atomism and neo-positivism. On atomism
see B. Russell, Logical Atomism, in CONTEMPORARY BRTISH PHILosoPHY
(Muirhead ed. 1924). On neo-positivism see J. WEINBERG, AN ExAAvNATION
OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM (1936). On the relationship between atomism and
neo-positivism, the problem of reductive analysis, the problems of propositions about generals, and of logical constructions, see URmsoN, PmnOsoPmCAL ANALYSIS, pts. 1, 2 (1958).
15. For the beginnings of this way of analyzing, see URMsoN, op. cit. supra
note 14, pt. 3, with bibliography. On "dealing with knowledge" as distinct
from "conveying information" see A. Sesonske, Cognitive and Normative, 17
PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENONOLOGICAL RESEARCH 1, 2-3 (1956).
16. This trend is nowadays very strong both in England and on the Continent. In England the title of Stephen Toulmin's book, The Place of Reason in
Ethics (1950), might be more clearly expressed as "in what sense a moral
statement can be said to be supported by a reasoned argument." The resulting reconsideration of argument in the sciences led to his essays now collected in The Uses of Argument (1958). After distinguishing the "force"
of an argument from its "criterion," he advances the thesis that the "force"
is independent of the field in which the criterion lies, so that we can study
arguments as to their "force," without concern with the warrant of the
criteria, which is of varying degrees for various fields. The thesis may be
related to the old idea that arguments from necessary premises and from
probable premises may be comparable (though of course the conclusions
are in one case necessary and in the other only probable).
On the Continent, similar theses are related to the revival of studies of
Greek rhetoric. Notable among juristic studies are: A. GiULIANI, IL CON-
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Obviously, the first type of analysis of expression was mainly
directed to the language of natural science, and of logic and mathematics, and tended to regard other propositions especially those about
"values," or in terms of values, as meaningless, 1 unless they were
translatable into propositions of the cognitive type.18 And they also
had difficulty with imperatives, and propositions about general terms,
such as "England," or constructions such as "the average Englishman." The second type of this analysis, which is practiced in various
ways, concentrated on common language; but being mostly concerned
with the function of conveying information, it tended to select those
patterns of usage which for one reason or another seemed to have
this function. When confronted with evaluative or normative or
imperative propositions, they tended to run to the employment of
whole sets or systems of propositions. They tried to transfer methods
of handling the cognitive to the study of evaluations and imperatives,
choosing as subject-matter those imperatives which show tolerance
for either the logic of indicatives or the patterns of usage of indicatives. The effect was to discard from study those aspects of imperatives not in this way tolerant, which are systematically disconnected and which amount to utterances and ejaculations. The
third mentioned type of analysis is connected with the second insofar
as its attention is mostly concerned with "reasoned" and not "rational" persuasion; its trend has been rather to reformulate demonCETTO DI PROVA (1960), to which we refer for bibliography, and T. VIEHWEG,
ToPin uND JURiSPRUDENZ (1953). The main study is perhaps that of C.
PERELMAN & L. OLBnECHTs-TYTECA, TRAITA DE L'ARGUMENTATION (1958).
Toul-

min's thesis (The Uses of Argument, ch. 1 passim) that logic is generalized
jurisprudence, and the thesis of Perelman, that demonstration is a function
of persuasion (on which see discussion of various papers on the Theorie de la
Preuve, collected in 27-28 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE (1954))

supported with very similar argumentation.

are

17. See, e.g., AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AN Looic 107 (1946): "If I say to
someone 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said 'You stole that money' . . . . If I ...
say 'Stealing money is wrong,' I produce a sentence which has no factual
meaning-that is, expresses no proposition which can be either true or false.
It is as if I had written 'Stealing money!'"
18. Of course, this is not so if the value is in effect defined as a name for
verifiable facts. So imperatives also raise no difficulty if they may be understood as an elliptical form of asserting that undesirable consequences will
follow disobedience. But neo-positivists-especially English-did not regard
imperatives as disguised indicatives-perhaps due to the general influence
of Moore's attack on the "naturalistic fallacy." This does not, of course,
involve for many English analysts, the acceptance of Moore's consequential
ethical intuitionism. Pragmatism, and especially Dewey's instrumentalism,
have shown that the distinction between cognitive propositions and imperatives and norms is not so sharp, insofar as a proposition is seen as a function
of a whole process of inquiry. If the whole process is cognitive, then propositions which occur in it receive cognitive character, even if they are norms.
Cf. H. Fingerette, How Normativeness Can Be Cognitive but not Descriptive
48 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 634 (1951); Sesonske, op. cit. 5. On the other hand,
norms are thus a product of the process. Cf. G. Tarello, Norma e Giuridificazione nella Logica di Dewey, ATTI DEL IV CONGREsso NAZIONALE DI
FiLosoriA DEL DIRTTo 280 (1960).
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strations in terms of "persuasion" than to cover new ground. 19
Now philosophical linguistic analysis of the problems of justice
has had two great merits. It has certainly collected and systematized
considerable information; and it has worked well and hard on the
logic of value-judgments (or imperatives, or norms).20 Yet, the concern of philosophical analysis is still remote from the problem of
the meaning or meanings of emotionally charged words. It is concerned with those segments of language which are purposeful, which
serve-and are employed-to convey knowledge, information, orders,
and which, therefore, constitute more or less coherent segments of
experience. The early concern of this philosophic trend was the
formalized languages of mathematics and logic. When some analysts
reverted to common language,21 their reaction was mainly against
the tendency to regard as meaningless whatever is neither an analytical nor an empirical proposition. But they remained concerned with
the meaningful; they were willing to recognize as meaningful more
propositions than their predecessors, but they never pretended to
analyze what they regarded as meaningless. When they found
segments of language to which a particular system of logic seemed
unfitted, they were willing to recognize this fact. Yet the cases where
they did so tended merely to be in areas where, though a particular
principle (for instance, of contradiction) does not go, the conveyance
of information is still possible and some statements are certain in
their content, and objectively determinable (even if not by rigid
verification) as to their truth. 22 When they examined evaluation,
19. The above is true even of those authors who do not believe that the

sttidy of the logical structure of imperative sentences is part of the study
of the imperative function. For instance, R.M. Hare, believing that the
connectives "if," "and," "or," and the sins of negation "are best treated
as part of the phrastic of the sentences' (Imperative Sentences, 58 MIND
(1949), and THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 1,2,3, and 1,11,5 (1952), with qualifications as to the quantifiers), suggests that, "by using the ordinary logical
connectives, as they are used in the indicative mood, in the phrastics of
our remodelled imperative sentences, we could do with the revised imperative mood everything that we now do with the natural one."
In splitting the propositions analyzed into a phrastic and neustic part, Hare
maintains that the phrastic can be logically manipulated whatever the neustic
be; and Hare's fourth chapter on the "Decisions of Principle" makes it clear
that the non-descriptive communication he has in mind is not that constituted
by utterances and ejaculations which are not systematically related. Such
utterances and ejaculations were, of course, the favorite theme of analyses of
the first mentioned type.
20. See notes 16 ff.
21. Especially in England. For a very clear account of the beginning of the
newer conception of analysis, see URMSON, PmLosoPmcAL ANALYsis, esp.
pt. 3 (1958).
22. We are thinking, of course, of discussions about the distinctiveness of
various language-fields or language strata; and in particular about the fact
that, in some language-fields, the terms (words) are undefined and refer to
"qualities" of degree, so that the language-field is not structured on a logic
including the principle of excluded middle. Segments of common language,

for instance the language of colors (as "yellowish"), are of this type. "If
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they were concerned with value judgment, not with value utterances.
(The neo-positivists, who spoke of these utterances, dismissed them
as meaningless.) When they examined imperatives, they had in
mind systems of imperatives, as for instance legal systems, where a
certain amount of "meaningful information" can be conveyed and
statements are correlatable by reference to the system.
So that the interest of the analyst-philosopher has tended to
begin just where the problem of communication really ends.p There
is perhaps, indeed, a temptation for the philosopher-analyst to deny
the problem of communication precisely because he has chosen to use
his analysis on expressions on which communication is apparently
not lacking or is only slightly lacking. And even when he yields to
this temptation, he may still feel, especially when he is concerned
with a problem in which he himself is emotionally engaged, that his
analysis has helped understanding.
Chaim Perelman's contribution on "Justice" is perhaps the most
striking illustration of how a philosopher may be convinced that he
several colors are shown to me which differ only slightly they do not exclude
one another." F. Waismann, Language Strata, in FLEW, LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
11, 21 (2d series 1955). And see the end of section III infra.
These discussions interest us here, because reference had been made to
color-terms to explain evaluation-terms (for instance the analogy between
"yellow" and "good" in Moore). From Moore's intuitionalist ethical viewpoint the drive of the analogy was that both words stand for simple ideas,
and therefore cannot be defined, since they (differently from complex ideas)
cannot be analyzed into components. (See the critique of this in P.H.
NOWELL-SmiTE, ETmcs chs. 2, 3 (1954).) Independently of Moore's purpose, the
analogy is also interesting, however, as suggesting-in the light of the language-strata viewpoint-that the logic of "yellowish" could be referred to
"goodish" and (why not?) "justish." Admittedly "yellowish" is in common
use, and "justish" is not; but may it not be the case that the "just" in some
contexts has with the "just" in other contexts a relation similar to that of
"yellowish" with "yellow." See notes 90, 91 infra, and accompanying text.
23. In the Introduction to A. FLEW, op. cit. supra note 22, which exemplifies
the new analytical trend, Flew observes: "If it were true-which it certainly
and fortunately is not-that there is no standard usage of words within any
group at any time, then it would not be merely a few perverse philosophers
whose position would be undermined. For though of course much of our
usage is constantly changing, and does vary considerably from district to
district, and from social group to social group, still it is only and precisely
insofar as two people use and understand words in some accepted, standard
way that communication between them is possible." (pp. 8-9) Accepting this,
if we then assume that within a certain group there is no communication,
what is the result of the philosophers being "so concerned about deviation
from standard English (or whatever other language is being used or discussed), and the elucidation of the ordinary use of language"? (p. 8) Might
this not endanger clarity, if there might be a tendency to entertain views
of "standard" and of "ordinary," where in fact there is no standard nor
usage which is ordinary? Flew asks: "[H] ow else could one investigate the
concept of knowledge than by studying the various correct uses of the word
know?" (p. 9) Let it be conceded that "correct" means "according to ordinary
usage or standard"; yet if there is no standard this proposition resolves itself
into a circle. Philosophical analysis, thus understood, therefore, is no substitute for research in historical semantics in areas where the problem involved
is actual lack of communication.
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has helped the understanding of a problem of communication, when
in reality he hag excluded that problem from. the ambit of his
analysis. And for this reason, it is worth the close attention of both
jurists and philosophers.
II. JUSTICE, LOGIC, AND THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES.

Perelman's contribution to the UNESCO project cannot be fully
grasped except as a part of his general position, as seen in his
major monograph on the problem of the analysis of justice. In fact,
some features of the 1957 essay can only be understood at all if we
place them in this wider context. In particular, as we shall see, the
1957 essay presupposes an acceptation of the term "justice" in which
justice is not-or not only-the label for a conception, a feeling, a
desire, an approval, a proposal, and so on, but is-or is chieflythe name for a particular relation (of an act, or a man, or an inferior
rule) to a governing rule.
It is notable that this main analytical research on the usage of
this emotionally charged word, has as its cultural background a sort
of relativism of values not dissimilar from the position advocated by
Radbruch (especially in his first period).24 While Radbruch chose a
broad path of philosophy for reaching value-relativism, Chaim Perelman's work on justice is an impressive example of how similar positions can be reached via the science of logic, including mathematical
science, leading by a very different route to similar postures of openminded non-commitment to any particular content of the concept of
25
justice.
After some years of work on Piroblems of logic and mathematical
reasoning, this writer turned his attention to the techniques of rhetorical reasoning as a means to induce persuasion, and to a history
and re-exploration of the old distinction between logical (cogent)
and rhetorical (non-cogent) argument. 26 By this natural but unusual
path, he approached the problems of legal and ethical reasoning on
the apparent hypothesis that the distinction between logical (cogent)
24. It is hoped to develop this parallel in the forthcoming second edition
of The Province and Functionof Law.
25. Chaim Perelman, born in Warsaw in 1912, has lived in Belgium since
1925, and gained doctorates in law (1934) and philosophy (1938) at the
University of Antwerp. He worked at the University of Warsaw in 1936-37,
then a centre of neo-positivist logicians especially concerned with mathematics; and it was there that Perelman wrote his early contributions to logic.
See especially his Les Paradoxes de la Logique, 45 iND 204 (1936); Une
Solution des Paradoxes de la Logique et ses Consequdnces pour la Conception de L'Infini, 6 TRAVAUX DU IX CONGRES INT'L DE Pun.. 206 (1936); L'Equivalence, La Ddfinition et la Solution du Paradoxe de Russel in 5 L'ENSEIGNEMENT

MAT1mVAmQuE 350 (1937) (36 ann6e nos. 5-6, 350).
26. Perelman's most important works of that period are De la Justice
(1945); Rhdtorique et Philosophie (1952); 1 & 2 Trait6 de l'Argumentation
(1958).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

argument and rhetorical (non-cogent) argument is correlated with
the distinction between descriptive and normative language. 27 He
sought in particular to identify the bounds within which it is possible
to argue cogently about the conception of justice, and beyond which
(by the same token) cogent argument is not possible.28 He proceeds,
as it were, on the hypothesis that the empirically found limits of
men's agreement concerning justice were in some way correlated
with the range of problems which could be isolated as the subject of
cogent argument2a
A. New Symbols and Old, as Used in Definition
The common assumption of logicians is that every definition is arbitrary (that is, conventional), insofar as the new symbol (used as
the definiendum) has never anything more than the meaning of the
whole set of symbols by which it is defined. But this is so only when
symbols are used which are new. When the symbol which we define
is a name which is (a) already part of a living language, and (b)
charged with emotional connotations, the process of definition cannot
be said to be arbitrary.2 9 In fact, such a term, assumed as a definiendum, should be simply the equivalent of the symbol or set of symbols employed as definiens; but an emotionally charged term cannot
be reduced to an equivalent of an arbitrarily chosen definiens; it will
instead shift its emotional value on to the definiens.30 Because of
this difference, it is the case that whenever we give a conventional
(arbitrary) definition of a new term, no one will have reason to
challenge our definition (except on the grounds of its technical
27. The latter distinction may of course be traced well back in the British
empiricists' tradition (from Hume onward), as well as in continental Kantian
and post-Kantian (Windelband) traditions.
28. PERELmAN, DE LA JUSTICE (1945). We shall refer later to Professor
Perelman's article for the UNESCO project, La Justice (le Sens du Terme et
son Evolution dans le Contexte de la Tradition Philosophique en Langue
Franqaise), 41 REvuE INTEATIONALE DE PmtosoPmn 344 (1951).
28a. Cf. his late explicit assertion of this in La R~gle de Justice, 14 DIALECTICA 230, 230-31 (1960).
29. Id. at 10-11.

30. Suppose we say-(l) "Justice is going to the movies once a week." The
result is the substitution of the word "Justice"
for "going to the movies
once a week." Suppose now that we say-(2) "Karabiri is going to the movies
once a week." The result is the substitution of "Karabiri" for "going to the
movies once a week." If the process of definition is arbitrary, the results would
have exactly the same meaning. This is not so, because Justice is an old term,
to which the general reaction is of approval, whereas Karabiri is not. How are
the results different? The difference is as follows. If we, after the above (2),
say "Karabiri," we simply entertain the thought "to go to the movies," and
if we think of "going to the movies" the definition does not superimpose a
judgment. Under (1), if we say "Justice" we still say "going to the movies";
but if we entertain the idea of "going to the movies" the definition will superimpose the judgment, "It is just." The difference is determined by the fact
that to say, "It is Karabirian" does not add approval or, for that matter, disapproval, to "going to the movies," whereas "It is just" does add at least a
conditioned approval.
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utility); but whenever we define, apparently in the same way, the
old conventionally and hence emotionally charged term "justice,"
discussions are liable to be endless. Such discussions seek to find an
agreement on the values carried by the term as witnessed by the
common usage of it: they would not make sense if every definition
were arbitrary.
From this observation, Perelman might have moved to observe
that the definition of such terms must await altogether general
agreement on the values carried by the emotionally charged term, or
that in view of the unlikelihood of such agreement, attempts at
definition should be abandoned, or that many alternative definitions
should be circulated each among the group of people so agreed.
Perelman, however, chose another path (which we shall be concerned
to question). For him, since the emotive component in such terms
renders them intractable as a whole to ordinary logical definition,
we must try to separate off by agreement the part not touched with
emotive meaning. We must separate off the conceptual meaning,
which we can define, from their emotive meaning, which we cannot.
We must therefore split the definiendum, transferring the emotional
charge to another complementary concept, and leaving for definition
the residual emotion-free concept. 3 '
B. The Term "Justice"in Common Use
The term "justice" is among the terms most in common use, and
among the richest in the variety and conflict of emotive meanings
associated with it. It is thus in Perelman's view a supreme example
of the need to separate off the emotional from the conceptual elements before attempting definition.
Until this is done, the word as in common use conveys such numerous irreconcilable meanings as to make definition hopeless. These
rival meanings, or some of them, Perelman states in terms of six
formulae: (1) To everyone the same thing. (2) To everyone according to his merits. (3) To everyone according to his performance. (4)
To everyone according to his needs. (5) To everyone according to
his rank. (6) To everyone according to the law.32 The first formula
treats everyone as equal regardless of difference. The second differentiates between classes on the basis of an intrinsic property,
"merit," which still has to be defined. The third formula differentiates between classes according to an objective fact of performance,
as in examinations, and it implies a kind of material proportionality
31. PERELmAx, op. cit. supra note 28, at 13.
32. Id. at 15. In his recent paper, Justice et Droit Naturel, ANNALES DE
PHIILosoPmIE PoLrIQUE 13 (1959) (of the Institut International de Philosophie

Politique), Hans Kelsen has elaborated upon Perelman's versions of the concrete formulae. And see note 75 infra.
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as contrasted with the moral proportionality of the second.3 3 The
fourth formula, designed to reduce hardships (as in social legislation), also differentiates between classes according to "need," a term
only less in need of definition than "merit." The fifth formula, according to Perelman, of treatment- according to rank, differs from
the other formulae because it is not universalistic, and divides men
into classes to be treated differently. But this is misleading, since
all the formulae except the first, and possibly the last, also make such
a division. The only difference as to rank is that, if this is conceived
as inherited rank, the entitlement is unalterable from birth.34 The
sixth formula, according to Perelman, is identical with Ulpian's
maxim suum cuique; it resolves justice into a correct application of
positive law, and thus cannot serve -as a standard for criticising
positive law.3 5
At this stage of his argument, it will be observed, Perelman has
already moved from the term "justice" as the symbol for a concept,
a symbol charged with varied emotive meanings among different
people, to a consideration of six formulae which he has substituted
for these six emotive meanings. (This is, in the present view, a source
of much weakness in his analysis, to which we shall later refer, after
following his own argument through.) Due to the fact that these six
formulae "are as a rule irreconcilable" Perelman says, the inquirer
must now choose one of three courses. First, he may conclude that
"these different conceptions of justice have absolutely nothing in
common," and therefore that the only sensible inquiry is as to their
respective different meanings.3 6 The question of the meaning of
"justice" as common to them all is then treated as illusory. Second,
the inquirer may "choose one of the different formulae" and insist
and try to persuade others that that one is the only correct one.
Third, he can choose (as Perelman does) to try and "determine what
there is in common among the different conceptions of justice," which
he takes to mean (as a practical matter) the six more usual concep37
tions of justice which he has enumerated.
It will be noted that, strictly, the "conceptions" Perelman is here
working with, just like the Zwecke des Rechts of Radbruch, 38 are
33. Id. at 16-17.
34. Id. at 18.
35. Ibid. The identification of this with Justinian's suum cuique depends
on the word suum being rendered as "what each is entitled to according .to
law." In historical fact, though, the most important influence of the maxim
has been when that word is rendered ambiguously as "what each is entitled
to," thus compendiously restating the whole problem of justice.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 21.
38. See RADBRUCH, VORSCHULE DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 26 (1947); Radbruch,
La Securitd en Droit, 6,ARcHIVEs DE P HILOSOPHIE DU DroiT 86, 87 (1936); RAnBRUcHi, REcHTsPHILosopkrE (3d ed. 1932) .(-translated by K. Wilk in vol. vi of
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not empirically derived, even though the fact that there are many
conflicting conceptions is an empirically observed fact. In both cases,
however, .these writers have chosen to- work with examples most
familiar to their experience. But the strict position must still be
remembered. Thus, Perelman's conclusions, to be valid, must be
valid for every conceivable version of concrete justice.
C. FormalJustice'SeparatedOff from Concrete Justice
Perelman claims, like Radbruch, that the essential task in defining
the idea of justice is to clear away the confusions, and thus clarify
what the problems are. And the main result he hopes to have
achieved (as also Radbruch hoped) was not that men will then find
themselves agreed upon a common conception of justice, but rather
that they will see more clearly where the disagreements begin and
what they are about. To fix the point at which disagreement about
justice begins, also means fixing the point at which agreement about
it ends, which means finding "a formula of justice" which will contain
all that the various conflicting conceptions of justice have in common.
Provisionally, he takes as correct what he assumes to be agreed
from Plato right through to contemporary thinkers, that "the idea of
justice consists in a certain application of the idea of equality." 39 If,
Twentieth Century Legal Philosophy Series 45-224, at 91). This matter will
be further developed in the forthcoming second edition of STONE, PROVINCE.

39. PERELmAN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 13. Perelman asserts that "tout le
monde est d'accord sur ce point." But, even if this be true, it is only a verbal
agreement. Firstly, the concrete forms of "equality" which have been envisaged as identical with "justice" are sometimes so different that the agreement is patently only verbal. Secondly, there is nothing "in common" between
a concrete form of equality, as embodied for instance in a political programme,
and "equality" as a contentless "proportio." To introduce the conception of
equality in the analysis of justice does not permit a step forward because the
conception of equality presents to the analyst just the same set of problems

as the concept of justice.
Alf Ross, in his treatment of Justice (Ross, ON

LAW AND JUSTICE, ch. 12
(1958) follows the outline of Perelman, but does not stop at identifying justice
with equality. He then proceeds "to show that the formal demand for
equality as such does not mean much, and the practical content of the
demands of justice depends on presuppositions lying outside the principle of
equality, namely, the criteria determining the categories to which the norm
of equality shall apply." Equality, in abstracto, as well as justice in abstracto,
are both interchangeable names for merely "keeping to a rule." Insofar as,
nevertheless, we find these names used as asserting a content of justice or
equality, Alf Ross correctly says that "this content cannot be derived from the
principle of equality but must spring from the other element in the formulae
of justice, the presupposed material criteria."
To say that justice in abstracto means "keeping to a rule" and that this
formula only has a meaning when there is an outside criterion to give it
context, does not dispose of all discussions in terms of justice which arise in
the moment of choosing the criterion, or, as Ross puts it, in the legislative
moment. Here the question concerns the choice of a determinate criterion to
cope with a particular problem in a particular social context. To such a
question answers can be given supported by reasons. Insofar as "justice"
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despite this, the formulae of justice still have remained in conflict
it must be because each "contains an undetermined element," a
"variable," yielding a different conception of justice. The general
agreement that equal treatment is involved in the idea of justice
will thus pertain to the common concept, yielding a formal or abstract definition of justice; and the different formulae of concrete
justice will represent the innumerable competing values which
40
different opinions graft on to this common concept.
Now Perelman's acceptance as true of the supposed agreement as
to the relation of justice to equality is only provisional. (He later
rejects its claim to be the essential criterion of formal justice.) Moreover, there is no a priori reason why emotive meanings which compete in many situations may not nevertheless all coincide up to a
point, that overlapping area constituting, if only we can discover it,
a part of the common concept, or the formal definition of justice. In
short, there is nothing in his argument thus far either compelling him
to center his definition of the "common concept" of formal justice
on equality, or excluding necessarily from this common concept some
aspect of the emotive meanings, that is of substantive values.
In fact, as will later be elaborated, Perelman's argument proceeds
otherwise, treating his six illustrative formulae of concrete justice
as if they were themselves the emotive meanings. All these formulae,
he thinks, though disagreeing as to what was the essential characteristic (being "a man," or having "merit," or having "objective performance," or having "needs," or having "rank," or being "legally
entitled"), agreed that equality was essential as between all members of the class sharing this essential characteristic. 41 He concludes
that "it is possible to define formal or abstract justice as a principle
of action by which persons of the same essential class ought to be
treated equally."42
This definition of justice, says Perelman, is formal "because it
does not determine the categories which are essential to the enforcement of justice." It does not, in other words, determine what
is the essential by reference to which the class is to be identified; nor
becomes a compendious name for particular reason supported answers to
such questions (and not a name for a metaphysical entity), Ross's statement
that "justice is no guide for the legislator" and that its invocation means no
more than "banging the table" (p. 274) is unacceptable, and it is an unwarranted leap even in his own argument. It is simply not permissible to dispose
of a word which in different contexts may have different meanings, merely
because it does not always have the same meaning. What is called for is not
this, but rather for us to be aware of the meaning in the particular instance,
and resist the tendency even to believe that a name must correspond with an
entity comprehending all the possible particular meanings of the word.
40. PERELMAN, op. cit. supranote 28, at 26.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
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does it say how people within the class ought to be treated, except
that they should be treated equally. Conversely, the various formulae
conflict, because each chooses a different characteristic as the essential and only one for determining the class of equal entitlement.
Disagreement, then, begins when the essential characteristic is to be
chosen, and (we would add) at a point inevitably before any decision
as to justice in a concrete situation can be made.43 And the other
side of this is, in turn, that the different conceptions of concrete
justice, notwithstanding their differences, admit the same definition
of formal justice, namely that men included in the same essential
class be treated equally. The confusion arises from the fact that
everybody seeking justice seems to feel obliged to define concrete
justice, that is to include in the definition a determination of the
essential characteristic which is to base the claim to equality given
by formal justice. 44
It is implied in all this that formal justice cannot direct us to
any decision in a concrete case, that is to concrete justice, that the
choice which we make of the essential characteristic of the class of
equals to guide us to concrete justice is but a result of "our conception of the world, our way of distinguishing what something
is worth from what it is not worth." For "to define concrete justice
is to connect the definition of formal justice with a particular concept of the world." 45 Finally, it follows that the ideas of concrete
justice will vary in time, as changing moral, social or political ideas
modify the hierarchy of values actually held by men, and therefore
the essential characteristics by which the classes of people entitled
to equal treatment inter se are identified.46
This treatment implies that the idea of formal justice (that is, of
justice before it has become concrete justice imbued with a content
reflecting the proponent's conception of the world), coincides with that
part of the various versions of concrete justice which can be agreed
between the various proponents. We shall later give reasons for
thinking this not to be established by Perelman's argument, as well
as for thinking that the final outcome of his position implies a certain
unwarranted condescension towards the conflict and confusion of
definitions current among men.47
Perelman himself readily admits that the concept of justice, defined
as formal justice, loses at once its prestige and nearly all its emotional
meaning. 48 Another point, however, which he does not squarely face,
43. Id. at 28.
44. Id. at 41.
45. Ibid.
46. Id. at 40-41.
47. See p. 358 infra.
48. PERELmAN, op. cit. supra note 28 at 49-43.
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is that it is not only natural but also sensible for men to be more
concerned with the concept of justice at that point where its definition
has, at any rate, a chance of influencing the course of events in our
actual world. In Perelman's own terms, the definition of formal justice
cannot do this. A sensible man can therefore sensibly answer the
reproach at his distinterest in the possibility of agreement on the
definition of formal justice, that what he is interested in is not just
securing agreement, but rather securing justice in this world, as
he sees justice. In other words, the "justice" that Perelman is
concerned to define is not what men who are yearning for "justice"
are really concerned with.
The contentless formulae of Perelman's (and in his own different
way, also Radbruch's) main positions as to formal justice, may be
important clarifications for the non-committed intellectual looking
on at the human scene. For him it may be helpful always to keep
asking the question: "Are we concerned with formal justice, or with
one of the innumerable conceptions of concrete justice?" It will
permit him to examine the problems peculiar to formal justice, including (Perelman thought) the relations between formal and
concrete justice. 49 None of these activities, however, reach the point
at which a "practitioner" of justice can be expected to surrender
himself to them; and consequently certain observations will later be
called for concerning the further duties which arise for men (including the "theoreticians" of justice) after Perelman has completed his
analysis.50
D. Justice and Equality
While, for the purpose of discovering the precise areas of agreement as to the meaning of the concept of justice, Perelman took as
provisionally correct the general assumption of philosophers that the
idea of equality is the core of justice, he finally concludes that this
is not the best mode of statement. It is more accurate, he thinks,
to say that the core of formal justice is that individuals comprised in
the same essential category ought to be treated in the same manner.
Correspondingly, he thinks, the formulae of concrete justice "provide the criterion which permits us to tell when two beings are
comprised in the same essential category," and what is the content
of the identical manner in which all members of this category ought
to be treated. 51
While equality of treatment "for members of the same essential
category" is a logical consequence of the above, the final basis or
core of justice, even of formal justice, is simply (he thinks) "the
49. Id. at 43.
50. See p. 368 infra.
51. PERELMAN, op. cit. supra note 28 at 54.
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application of the same norm to every member of an'essential
'52
category," or even more simply that "we keep to a norm.
When formal justice is thus seen as merely the correct application of a norm, it is easy to see that it.is the element common to
all conceptions of concrete justice, and that the difference between
the various conceptions of concrete justice is simply that each enunciates a different norm, and says that justice consists in enforcing its-.
norm. Thus seen, too, formal justice has its logical base because it
enforces the imperative syllogism, and consists of "the observance
of a norm which enunciates the obligation to treat in a determined
manner each being of an essential category." 53
Stated in terms of logic, action is just if it conforms with the conclusion of a reasoning whose premises have been accepted, and one
of whose premises constitutes an imperative proceeding -from a
formula of concrete justice.5 4 In brief summation, then, formal
justice determines that an action is just in relation to any given norm,1
when it conforms to that norm. But per contra formal justice does
not say when that norm is just.P
E. Justice,Equity and Arbitrariness
Radbruch, but for different reasons, gets into conlike
Perelman,
siderable difficulty in relating "equity" (of course, in the wider
sense, not tied to the Anglo-American law of equity) as a separate.
concept to his idea of formal justice. What he appears to say is that
equity is resorted to when (for some reason not provided for by the
law,56 especially during periods of transitional change of values) 57 the
person judging feels that two or more essential characteristics basing
two or more competing concrete ideas of justice, are simultaneously
apt. Where these two concrete ideas would impose conflicting decisions in the particular case, the attempt to decide by way of com-r
promise (usually by a complex formula in which both formulae of
concrete justice are embraced without settling their coefficients of
importance) 58 is a resort to equity. Equity is thus "a tendency to
59
treat not too unequally men included in the same essential category."
52. Id. at 54.
53. Id. at 54, 60-61, for his animadversions on the relations between fornal
justice and "scientific law" and the role of deduction in each, which seem to
amount to saying that deductive logic is used in testing both.
54. Id. at 62. Perelman sees this position on formal justice as very similar
to what E. Dupr~el (2 TRAITP DE MoRALE 485-86 (1932)) calls "static justice,"
and defines as consisting "in the observance of an established rule, whatever
it may be." On the former's view, however, it is not of the essence that the
rule in question be established. Id. at 62-63.
55. Id. at 63-64.
56. Id. at 51.
57. Id. at 51-52.
58. Id. at 51.
59. Id. at 48.
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While this is not a historical account of equity in any system, it
is coherent in itself. The difficulty arises because Perelman presents
equity, not as the above would lead us to expect, as a going against
ideas of concrete justice, but rather as going against formal justice
itself.6 0 This seems impossible to follow. For once formal justice
has been defined as "a principle of action by which persons of the
same essential class ought to be treated equally," and once it has
been admitted that it is always possible to create new classes and to
consider them "essential," it is difficult to see how "formal justice"
in the above sense need ever be departed from. What can be departed from is a combination of (a) formal justice, and (b) a determination of what "essential category" stands for; but such a
combination amounts to an "interpretation" of formal justice by way
of a formula of concrete justice. Justice according to Perelman's
premises is "formal" only so long as it is not "interpreted." To say,
therefore, that the simultaneous application of more than one formula
of concrete justice indicates a disapplication of formal justice amounts
to a contradiction. If justice is formal, the justice alleged to be disapplied cannot be disapplied; while if it can be disapplied, it must be
concrete justice.
When, indeed, he directly confronts the question of arbitrariness,
Perelman is emphatic that where, owing to change in evaluation, it is
felt necessary to "treat differently two beings included in the same
essential category" it is always possible to give effect to this different
evaluation' without being formally unjust. For we can modify the
norm by which the'essential category is identified.6 1 But, on this
view, formal justice would be entirely tolerant of easy change in the
content of norms, by the device of changing the essential characteristic fixed upon by the particular idea of concrete justice to determine
the class of men among whom the very same norm must be properly
applied. And, in that case, what purpose does the idea of formal
justice serve at all in the actual world?
This, in substance, is the question which Perelman is brought to
face when he says: "If we desire that formal justice be not an empty
formula outside positive law, i.e., a norm of moral or natural law,
it is necessary to eliminate, as far as possible, arbitrariness from the
norms that formal justice has to enforce. '62 He properly observes
that this necessity to eliminate arbitrariness refers not to the form
of the norms, but to their content. But he believes he can complete
60. Id. at 48, 49, 52. His reasoning is obscured by other phrases, e.g., that
equity intervenes between "two formalisms" and that it is a rejection of
"legal formalism."
61. Id. at 65-67. He is here assuming, of course, that the existing norm is
not authoritatively imposed on the person judging.
62. Id. at 67.
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his consideration of formal justice by analyzing "the rational conditions which impose themselves on the norms of concrete justice,"
63
if these are to escape being arbitrary.
To provide such an escape, he starts from his above conclusion that
formal justice means conformity to the applicable norm. Where for
some reason it has been necessary to have two norms on a matter,
each with a different essential characterization of the class of persons
to whom it is applicable, the condition of these norms not being
arbitrary is this: "That these two norms with their difference are
both deduced from a more extensive principle," being "but particular
cases of that principle." 64 A norm not so deducible is arbitrary. A
norm so deducible is justified in terms of that more extensive.prin65
ciple, but it is not necessarily "just" in the sense of concrete justice.
In this latter sense, insofar as formal justice only means conformity
with the applicable norm in the treatment of all members of the
essential category specified by that norm, it cannot help us to determine which, as between two' norms which ex .hypothesi are not
both deducible from a common more extensive principle, is to be
regarded as the just one. For here ex hypothesi we are concerned
with norms of concrete justice, and the task is to find a term of
comparison of the essential categories, in order to justify, by means of
the relation between each category and the species from which it
66
derives, the difference of treatment of these categories themselves.
The justification of a norm thus challenged as unjustly favorable or
unfavorable to the members of the essential category which it
specifies, as compared with those of another category, must always
be by demonstrating how that specified category is "integrated into
a more general category," or that particular norm is derived from
67
a more general one.
At this point two questions arise. Why, finally, after a definition of
formal justice which purports already to embody whatever is common to all ideas of concrete justice, as well as whatever is conceptual rather than emotive in them, should he attempt the daring
enterprise of setting "the rational conditions which impose themselves on the norms of concrete justice"? Second, why, once having
entered on such an enterprise, did he stop short of what might seem
to be its expected climax? For this surely would be some overall
imperative, not too unlike the Kantian categorical imperative, requiring action according to a maxim which may become a universal
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 71.
Ibid.
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law.67 a But it seems to be offered by Perelman not as an a priori

absolute, but rather as a kind of by-product of the process of finding
a formula in which the empirically observed multiplicity of conceptions of justice is represented by a variable, that is, by theorizing
the relativity of all ideas of concrete justice.
Clearly, Perelman did not feel that he could venture so far. There
must, he says, be a point where we must stop in seeking to justify
norms of concrete justice. "Even if that stopping point is only provisional, and is not the result of any necessity, it anyway determines
the summit of a scientific situation, the top of a normative system. '68
If that point were not reached, the system would not be normative
but would express a logical necessity or an experiential universality.
For "every system of justice is but the development of one or more
values, whose arbitrary character is connected with their own nature"; and as against persons who deny that value or values, the
disagreement can only be recorded, not removed by reasoning. 6 When
agreement on values has permitted the rational development of a
normative system among certain men, arbitrariness consists of the
introduction of norms which are "extraneous to the system." A norm,
in short, is not arbitrary in itself, but only by its lack of justification
70
within the system.
Certain other consequences follow from this final position.
Since any value may serve as a foundation of a system of justice,
and justice lying in the relation of particular norms or actions to the
particular value, it is not the value which bears the attribute of
justic& 71 Further, "the arbitrariness of the foundation of justice

explains -why justice as a virtue is less overbearing than others,"
and why he who sincerely practices it being "always .. .aware of

the arbitrary foundation of his own system" will
norms too blindly and too rigidly.72
Finally, and paradoxically, justice emerges on this
taneously "the only rational virtue," and yet as one
on arbitrary irrational values, the foundations of
found only in the emotions associated with justice

not enforce its
view, as simulfounded finally
which can be
and injustice.73

67a. Only in his latest article, after the present paper went to press, (La

R~gle de Justice, 14 DEALECTICA 230, 230-31 (1960)) does Perelman address
himself to the relation of his position to the categorical imperative of Kant,

being (he says) "un schdma d'action de caract~re formel, qui ne soit pas
dopourvue de toute portde et de toute utilitd."
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

The hint of indecisiveness is here notable.
PERELMAN, op. cit. supra note 28, at 72-73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 73-75.
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81.
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F. Summary and Criticisms
A number of doubts as to particular steps in Perelman's argument
thus far have been raised ambulandoJ4 It remains before proceeding
to his theory of the "levels of justice" in section III to pull together his overall positions as to justice, and to state why, in the
present view, it cannot be regarded as a decisive break-through in
this difficult area.
Perelman's arguments may be thus summarized:
1. The nature of definition differs in relation respectively to new
symbols, and to symbols such as the term "justice" already found in
common usage. Only as to new symbols is the logician's view correct
that all definition is arbitrary.
2. In the term "justice" we must distinguish between the "conceptual" meaning and the emotive meaning of symbols. The search
for notional agreement about the theory of justice concerns the conceptual meaning.
3. The above distinction allows us to see the relation between
the conceptual components of justice (the conception of "formal
justice"), and the emotive meanings of the terms to particular
men or groups of men (the conceptions of "concrete justice").
4. The emotive meanings (that is, conceptions of "concrete justice")
are relative to particular Weltanschaungen held by men in a particular time and place, yielding "innumerable conceptions of concrete
justice."
5. Equality, though provisionally acceptable as the test of formal
justice is not the final test on full analysis. It is merely a logical consequence of the final test, which is that the same norm must be applied to every member of an essential category-or more simply that
a norm must be applied according to its terms.
6. Formal justice thus exists whenever the same norm is applied to
all members of one essential category (i.e., to all who are classified
together under the idea of concrete justice actually held for purposes
of the norm). But formal justice says nothing as to whether the idea
of concrete justice actually held, and which determines the essential
category and therefore the content of the norm, is just in content.
7. By the same token, formal justice cannot judge the justice of
the content of the different norms prescribed for the respective bodies
of members. What it can say is only that if the respective different
norms are all deducible from a single more general principle, they
will all be formally just; and that if they are not so deducible, some
or other of the rules or all of them will be formally unjust.
74. See this section supra passim.
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8. Formal justice in this last case also would be justice only for
each category relative to the other categories, and of the different
norms relative to each other. It does not otherwise depend on the
content of any of the norms which therefore may still not be concretely just.
9. The relation of "equity" to formal justice is that "equity" is an
attempt to give effect by compromise to two or more inconsistent
definitions of concrete justice, i.e., to two or more norms not deducible
from some more general principle. "Equity" in this sense is in inherent conflict with formal justice.
10. However high we are able to get in finding a more general
principle from which the different norms can be deduced, the value
embodied in that most general principle remains by its nature arbitrary. It is asserted, not demonstrated or demonstrable. As between those who agree on it there can then be sensible argument
about concrete justice within the norms deduced from it. As between
some who accept and others who reject it neither group can prove
the other wrong, nor itself right.
11. But it is precisely this arbitrary value embodied in the final
general principle which determines the meaning of concrete justice
in the particular system. It still remains true that as between two or
more norms and their sub-systems, based on different essential categories, formal justice cannot judge. All that it can say is that in
proportion as these norms can all be deduced from a more extensive
principle, the content of the whole body of law will approach conformity to the requirements of formal justice.
12. It is thus because "every system of justice is but the development of one or more values, whose arbitrary character is connected
with their own nature," that there cannot be "only one system of
justice."
13. A person really seeking justice, therefore, will be aware of the
arbitrary foundation of his own system, and will not be blind and
rigid in enforcing its norms.
The problem, then, which the learned writer set himself, was to
define the "concept" of "justice" in such a way that it can be agreed
upon regardless of differences in our ideas of material ("concrete")
justice and in the related ideologies. The advantage gained would
(he thought) be at least to clarify terms sufficiently to allow us to
determine what disagreements are real and what are mere misunderstandings arising from use of ambiguous terminology. How far has
he succeeded? And what result has been achieved? These are
separate matters and we first address ourselves to the latter. Assum-
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ing, in other words, that his arguments are accepted as leading to
his conclusions, how is the problem of understanding justice advanced?
One capital conclusion is that the conceptual component in justice,
which alone we can rationally argue about, consists merely of a
relation of logical derivation between the norm itself and, on the one
hand, every application of it downwards, and on the other, any superior norms from which the claim of that norm itself to be just purports
to be derived. Beyond this relation of logical derivability of norm
from more general norm (i.e., his "formal justice") rational argument
can determine nothing about justice. In particular, Perelman insists
that it cannot determine what the content of a norm or a system of
norms should be (that is, what value it should embody) in order to
do justice to the category of persons within it. Nor can it settle any
dispute between two or more conflicting views of that content (or
embodied value) arising within a system of norms. In these circumstances, the critic may be content to put down the book with two
questions and a sigh.
One question is: How, if at all, does the "formal justice" of a norm,
which this elaborate study has finally identified as the only part of
justice which can be rationally discussed, differ from its quality of
being "law" as ascertained by testing it for consistency with the basic
norm in Kelsen's "pure science of law"? There appears, with respect, to be no crucial difference, even to the point that in both cases
the fixing of the content of the "most general" (Perelman) or "basic"
norm (Kelsen) is from the standpoint of each arbitrary in terms
of his theory, and not susceptible of rational demonstration or even
argument concerning it. And if this is so, how is such a coincidence
possible when the two thinkers are ostensibly talking about different
things-one about "justice" and the other about "law"? This will be
more fully examined in the last two sections of this article. The
second question is whether a clarification of a concept ("justice")
which (however attractive it may be as an exercise in logic) ends by
relegating all parts of the concept with which men are seriously
concerned to the limbo where rational argument about it is said to
be impossible, can claim to be a serious contribution to the problem
of understanding what justice stands for in various historico-cultural
situations. The sigh is one of regret, that neither in 1945 nor in
1957 (in the essay shortly to be examined) does Perelman appear
to have taken into account Kelsen's main positions.7 4a It certainly
seems difficult to believe that, had he understood them, he could
74a. In his latest article on justice cited supra n.67a, at pp. 234ff., Perelman
points out certain similarities between his and Kelsen's thought, but not
the one here relevant.
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have failed to ask himself at least the former of the above two questions. And this would surely have warned him that a use of logic
which ended in so strange a coincidence ought to be re-examined for
75
the validity of its argument.
We must now ourselves examine some of the decisive difficulties
within Perelman's logical arguments. First, the problem which Perelman set himself was in terms of the conceptions of justice as held
by men-he was to seek elements which are (a) formal and (b)
common to the six main conceptions of concrete justice which he
enumerated. But for the purpose of solving it, he substituted for
"conceptions of justice" (which is an indeterminate term embracing
both rational thought and unrationalized feelings), the term "formulae
of justice" (which has a narrower ambit denoting an organized body
of rational thought). So that the reader and the author himself may
continue to think that the conclusions so logically reached are conclusions about justice tout court (or perhaps we should rather say,
tout large); whereas, in terms of the premises actually used, they
only concern formulae into which attitudes towards justice are cast.
And in particular there is excluded from the search for what is
"common" to the "conceptions" any analysis of emotional components,
these not being captured in the "formulae." It is scarcely surprising in
these circumstances that the author's conclusions have little to say
about what most moves men when they think and act in terms of
justice.
Second, even if it were a correct procedure to render each conception of justice into a formula, before seeking what "is common in
the more usual conception of justice," a research so directed should
75. The above paragraph concerns Perelman's notion of formal justice in
relation to Kelsen's notion of law. In fairness, it should here be noted
that when Kelsen addresses himself to Perelman's notion of justice he, like
us, perceives that to resolve justice into equality understood as equal treatment of members of an essential category to be determined according to
concrete formulae, leads nowhere. He observes that the above equality principle "n'est que la consequence logique du caract6re g~ngral d'une norme qui
prescrit que dans des constitutions determindes un traitement determind doit
6tre appliqud. Si donc ce principe est une exigence de la logique et non
de la justice, it ne peut 6tre considerde comme Telement commun a toutes les
normes de justice." KELsEN, op. cit. supra note 32, at 57. For related reasons
Kelsen also insists that what is spoken as equality before the law is nothing
but "I'application de la loi conformement a la loi." Id. at 57.
It is curious that Kelsen here stops short of perceiving that if Perelman's
notion of justice is thus but another name for "une exigence de la logique,"
his own notion of "law" may need to be defended against a similar objection.
See infra section III A, B, and section IV A, B, and passim, where we venture
to suggest a partial defence. It is still more curious that even in relation to the
notion of "justice" Kelsen's final position repeats, in terms of conformity with a
basic norm, the very error above which he, as well as the present writers,
perceive in Perelman. See note 80 infra.
In connection with our criticism of Perelman on the present ground, see
sections III and IV passim.
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surely take into account each formula as a whole. For it is still
the meaning of the conception which is under inquiry, and this should
not be confused, much less equivalated, to what is in common in
the process of formulation itself, or the linguistic connectives present
in each formula. To seek what is "common" (in Perelman's term) to
-(1)
"Every man is endowed with memory" and (2) "Every dog is
endowed with memory" may mean quite different things. It may
mean to seek- (a) what is common to the two statements as to their
linguistic expression, i.e., what is "common" to them as sentences
("Every" and "is endowed with"), or (b) what is common to men
and dogs (the "memory"), or (c) what is common to the respective
"memories" of men and dogs. If the whole search stems from an
attempt to understand the "conception of memory," alternative (c)
would obviously be the vital one; the concern would be whether the
word "memory" has the same meaning-coverage (and if so what) in
the human and canine contexts. If, when this was the assumed
concern, the inquirer offered us the conclusion that what is common
to our conception of "memory" were the linguistic connectives
"every" and "is," this should certainly not be accepted without challenge. For while it is perfectly true that memory "is" predicated
of "every" component when it is predicated of the class, this truth is
merely a result of the very definition of the relation between "class"
and "member of the class" and says nothing specific at all about
''memory" or "memories."
Likewise, when Perelman says that justice suggests the idea of a
certain equality, basing this on the fact that all the examined formulae provide equal treatment for a class of people (that is, for the
same rule to be applied to each member of it), and finally offers as
a definition of justice, "a principle of action by which persons of
the same essential class ought to be treated equally" (or by which
the same rule is applied to all members of it), he is saying nothing
at all about justice (whether formal or other than formal). Rather he
is stating the fairly obvious truth that once something is predicated
of a class, it is predicated also of the members of it (whether the
copula be "is" or "ought to be"); and that formulae of justice do not
logically and/or linguistically differ from other formulae. One may
feel inclined to think, in short, that Perelman's "formal justice" is
really only an elementary illustration of an elementary principle of
logic, telling us little that is new about logic, and nothing at all about
"justice." And if we then translate Perelman's assertion that "disagreement about application of justice resulting from different conceptions of concrete justice" should not preclude agreement "on the
definition of the formal part of justice," from what it seems to concern (formal justice) into what it really concerns (logic), it would
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mean that the above disagreement should not preclude an agreement on the definition of the concept "class." And the present writers
would agree that there is no reason whatever why it should.
III. JUST ACT, JUST RULE, JUST ACTOR

A. "Justice" at Different "Levels"
The view has been reached in section II that a merely logicalanalytical method cannot make any decisive contribution to our
understanding of men's experience with justice. 6 This conclusion,
clearly, warranted from Perelman's professedly analytical study of
1945, is further confirmed, and the reasons for it much illuminated,
by his later study of 1957, which purports to be an historical account
of the development of the conception of justice.
The development of this conception has, he thinks, been affected
not only by different ideologies creating conflicting concrete ideas of
justice, of which it was a main purpose of his 1945 study to dispose.
No less important, he thinks in 1957, has been the tendency to
theorize about justice at what he calls different "levels" (niveaux),77
and in particular as a "value" which can be predicated either of (a)
an action, or of (b) a rule, or of (c) a reasonable agent.7 8 From this
triple illustration one would assume that what he calls "levels" should
better be called "contexts" or "spheres of usage," especially since
to call them "levels" is to beg ab initio a central question to which
this essay is directed, namely, whether there is any hierarchical relation between them.7 9
Taking his departure from the variety of "levels" of speaking of
justice which are found in discourse, he concludes that the "levels"
are related to each other, building on his earlier monograph on
Justice of 1945. In that study he essayed to find, behind the many
conflicting conceptions of concrete justice, a single underlying conception of "formal justice" common to them all. Conformity to a rule
becomes so crucial in all of Perelman's solutions that it will have
to be considered whether when he speaks of justice, he may not
really be thinking of law. It may also compel us to find that his
76. As distinct from the understanding of a particular body of legal propositions, positive or hypothetical.

77. Perelman, La Justice, 41 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 344
(1957), apparently reprinted in 3 ANNALES DE L'INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE
PHmosoPHIE PrITQUE 124 (1959).
78. Id. at 344.

79. For this reason though this paper will follow Perelman, by translating

"niveaux" as "levels," we shall render this latter in quotes wherever this is
necessary to remind us of the danger of being misled by the word "levels"
into believing that the question of hierarchy can in any way be affected by
Perelmen's unexplained choice of this term. See also section IV infra.
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belief (which it will be submitted is quite unjustified) that- his
analysis has helped the clarification of justice, may arise from the
fact that his approach to the meaning of "justice" through a logical
approach to language, has led him to discard from the meaning of
"justice" most of what distinguishes "justice" from "law."
Perelman's overall aim, at any rate, appears to be to impose order
on a confusion of "levels" and ideologies, and to show that something
can be said of justice which is acceptable whatever the "level" and
whatever the ideological content. Moreover, the imposition of such
order involves in this treatment a recognition of hierarchy among
these "levels"; a hierarchy which results from the thesis of his 1945
work that all are finally translatable in terms of rules. In La Justice,
as has been seen, Perelman thought he had isolated the unity of
formal justice common to all ideologies, that is, to all ideas of concrete justice. And he convinces himself in his 1957 essay that his
historical survey demonstrates also the unity of the value called
justice at all three "levels" of just rule, just action, and just actor.
It is with this latter purported demonstration that we are concerned in this section. The question is: What can be said about justice
which is equally applicable when predicated of rules, actions and
agents? But before approaching Perelman's answer, it must first be
observed that Perelman gives no attention to the chief problem
confronting the translation of justice on the level of actions into
justice on the level of rules. Insofar as Perelman's view of the relation of just rule to just action resolves itself (as has been seen
above) into the relation of a class to a member of the class, change
of "level" from one to the other involves the problem of translatability of general propositions into particular ones, and vice versa.
Suppose, for instance, we say: "Act a is x," and then we say "Class
A is x" (where A = all a's, i.e., Class A consists of all the known
entities having in common the assumed essential characteristic "a").
When I say: "Act a is x" and also "Class A is x," I put forward two
very different propositions. In fact, "a is x" can be verified if x
is empirically observable, a being a particular act; but "Class A is
x" (i.e., that every particular fact "a," known and still to be known,
is x) can never be verified, even if x is empirically observable, for
we cannot empirically know all the a's which might fall within the
Class A: it can only be falsified, if we meet an a which is not x.
Such a difference between general and particular statements has long
troubled the philosophy of science, giving rise to many theories not
here relevant.
Insofar as Perelman does not feel himself confronted with this
problem at all, his historico-semantic essay of 1957 must of necessity
be proceeding on two tacit assumptions. One is that propositions of
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justice are not factual statements; for if he regarded "act a is just"
as analytically reducible into factual statements, then he would certainly have concerned himself with the instant problem of the relation between general and particular statements. Presumably, then,
his first assumption is that propositions of justice are normative and
not factual. Second, he must be assuming that whatever be the
case as to the intertranslatability of general and particular statements of fact, there is no such problem in the normative field, where
he places propositions of justice. These assumptions are of the same
pattern as his explicit assertion that the basic normative statement
is the general statement, that is, the rule, on which assumption it is
always possible to infer the particular from the general, but not
vice versa. In other words, Perelman assumes that when we speak
in terms of justice, the primary level (that is, the one to which all
others are referred) is the level of general statements. The term
"justice," in other words, is assumed to be a predicate for a class of
actions, and only for such, and therefore finally to be understood on
the "level" of rules. Furthermore, he assumes that there is always
translatability from the rule to the act,8 0 this being the logical translatability of the property of a class into the property of each member.
On these assumptions the historical excursus runs fluently. The
conception of "justice" is considered at different "levels."8' At the
"level" of the act, justice is adherence to a rule,8 2 and the familiar
discourse of the mechanical theories of the legal decision is reproduced.83 When the process of legal decision appears to be based
not on a rule but on a singular happening of a particular proposition
80. Moreover, as we pointed out in section I (B, 3), the translation from
propositions of the type "A is x" to propositions of the type "Y is x" and
vice versa cannot be a true translation. This is not seen by Perelman. It also
seems to be overlooked by Kelsen (op. cit. supra note 32 at 1) where he says:
"On dit d'un homme, en particulier d'un legislateur ou d'un juge, qu'il est

juste ou injuste. Dans ce sens, la justice est presentde comme une vertu huinaine." Then, after a few lines, he flatly states: "La justice d'un homme est
la justice de son comportement social. Et la justice de son comportement
social consiste en ceci qu'il est conforme et une norme constituant la valeur
de justice." These norms, he adds, somewhat tautologically (norms being after
all norms), have "un caract~re gdndral." It is clear that he is here talking of
"justice" as he (Kelsen) understands it, and that in his understanding the
test of justice is conformity with a basic norm within a system of norms.
His test for justice, therefore, appears to be similar both to Perelman's test
for "formal justice," and to his own test for "law."
As to Kelsen's failure to carry through his criticisms of Perelman's notion
of "justice" as based on the principle of equality, see note 73a supra. As to its
relation to his notion of "law," see section III A and section IV passim.
81. Perelman, supra note 77, at 344-45.
82. Id. at 345.
83. "L'ideal de justice tend, a ce niveau, a se modeler sur les operations les
plus 6l4mentaries de I'arithmdtique et de la physique: on voudrait que les
d4cisions justes soient conformes e une pesde, & une mesure ou 4 un calcul."
Later on, referring to his previous De la Justice, Perelman observes that this
is nothing but "la conception formelle de la justice." (Ibid.)
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(or precedent), this precedent is converted into the application of
a rule, that is, of the schema of reasoning embodied in it.8 The
adherence to the rule, whatever it may be, is what constitutes the
justice of the act.
The result of this is to displace from the "level" of the just act
to the "level" of the just rule, all discourse other than that of "mechanical" decision making. Yet, of course, most challenges to the
possibility of mechanical application of rules have proceeded precisely at the "level" of inquiry concerning what act is to be deemed
just. This is very clear when we think of the vast literature concerned with the law-creative role of judicial decisions, whether this
is focused on the conflict between various legal propositions available
to serve as premises, or with those arising from alternative methods
of deriving a conclusion from a given premise. 85 It has been pointed
out how difficult it is-starting with the single decision-to recog86
nize the very pre-existence of a rule unaffected by the decision. It
has been remarked that the only way to speak of equity as distinct
from law (in the general sense, of course, and not that of the settled
part of Anglo-American "equity") is to refer to cases where decision
87
is subordinated not to rules of law but to indeterminate standards.
All these discussions proceed on the bdsis that the intertranslatability of the statements "Class A is just" and "a is just" constitutes
a serious problem in law and in jurisprudence. Perelman, however,
having by his very assumptions already displaced all these discussions from under the heading of "just act," notes only that the
problems of "interpretation" and of "equity" have reference to the
heading "just rule."88
In a word, doubts about the possibility of translation from particular to general propositions or vice versa is interpreted by Perelman
as a critique of the content of the general proposition in question;
whereas in reality these doubts should lead him to rethink his whole
position as to the primacy of the level of rules. For a central meaning of these doubts is that this primacy can only exist insofar as this
translation is possible. From this vantage point it would become
clear that, insofar as problems of "interpretation" and "equity"
inevitably arise, this primacy of justice at the "level" of rule does
not exist in the sense of Perelman's assumption.
It also thus becomes clear how Perelman's analysis finally leaves
84. Id. at 346: "[P]rgcddents fournis par des judgments ant rieurs, qui

forment un schema de raisonnement applicable au cas present
85. See section IV infra, passim.

...

"

86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Perelman, supra note 77, at 348: "Ds que . . . il y a d6saccord
quant a L'application de la loi, nait le probl~me de la r~gle juste." Cf. 348-350.
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him with a model of justice as an axiomatic system, 'a system of
tautologies permitted by the axioms. At the level of an action, in
Perelman's view, justice depends on deduction from a rule. But
what about the justness of that rule itself? This question is to be
referred to the conformity of that rule to some more extensive rule
from which it is deduced. If so deducible, it is just quoad that
more extensive rule; if not so deducible, it is not so just. Unless we
so understand him, we cannot get beyond the first rule which covers
the act. If the question is whether "action a is just," this is to be
referred to Rule I, that "Class A is just." But if the question is
whether Rule I is just, and he desires to answer the question without
reference to some further rule, what can he say? For an affirmative
answer, he could only say, "'Class A is just' is just"; for a negative
answer, only that "'Class A is just' is not just." But these answers
would, in Perelman's terms, merely restate or deny Rule I, unless
he can refer them to the consistency of Rule I with some more extensive rule.
So he must always remain at the "level" of the rule, and it becomes
understandable why all discussions about interpretation, judicial lawmaking, equity and the like are viewed by him in terms of the
content of the rule in question, and proposals that some other rule
should replace the one criticized. Inevitably, on this line of thought
(which would read better for law than for justice, though not
unquestionable even there), every question of justice (and somewhat
more sensibly of law) becomes a question about what is the prevailing rule, and ultimately about what is the ultimately prevailing
rule, that is, the axiom or axioms from which the whole system of
normative rules can be derived.Sa
It is in this sense, as already observed, that Perelman reaches a
theory of justice which is in substance identical with Kelsen's pure
theory of law. By this we not only mean that Perelman's view of
"justice" resembles a legal system viewed as a static system of norms
such as Kelsen describes, but we also mean that on closer inquiry Perelman's view of justice also resembles Kelsen's own view
of the legal system as a dynamic system of norms. And when (as
will further be discussed hereafter) the top-level rule is identified
with God, and we are thus in presence of a Grundnorm of a dynamic
system in the Kelsenite sense, distributing legislative authority, this
latter resemblance approaches identity.
This identity of Perelman's description of "justice" with Kelsen's
description of "a legal system" indicates that one or other (or
88a. In his article of 1960 (supra n.28a) after the present paper went to
press, Perelman further entrenched himself in this position by substituting

for the phrase "la justice formelle," the phrase "la r~gle de justice."
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perhaps both) of these theories, whatever the ostensible intent of its
author, is not talking about a segment of experience, the one of

law, the other of justice. Otherwise, how could these two fields,
which human experience undoubtedly distinguishes, be described
in precisely the same manner? The reason for this curious concurrence seems to be that each of these theories consists in essence

of a framework of tautological propositions about variables. Each
variable can be given different values according to different situa-

tions, to enable the student of a segment of experience to draw
necessary conclusions from assumed premises. Clearly, whether
their authors are aware of it or not, such theses amount to a kind of
PrincipiaMathematica venture in the juristic field; and it becomes
then crucial to ask what utility in the respective fields of justice
(Perelman) and law (Kelsen) such a tautological system can have.
The fourth section of this paper will attempt to answer this question
in detail: but certain introductory observations must be offered
immediately.
What is lacking in Perelman and, to a certain extent, in Kelsen
too, allowing them to fall into such extreme formalism of position,
is the recognition of the limited services that can be expected from
efforts to state in "perfect" language, the meaning of assertions or
judgments in terms of value found in experience to be made in common language. As is well-known, the conception of a "perfect" language was connected with atomism, and with the idea that there is
only one mathematical system. Atomism-and, after it every kind
of reductive analysis-was connected with the principle of verification. Moreover, atomism and reductive analysis assumed a universe
of discourse in which the possibility of descriptions and conceptual
constructions was excluded. The idea of a perfect language met its
fate with the discovery of workable and useful systems of mathematics based on axioms different from the classical ones. A difficulty
of reductive analysis was that general propositions could not satisfactorily be understood as conceptual constructions of particular ones.
At levels where ordinary language uses irreducible concepts-such
as State, England, and so on-the analytical trend in philosophy
shifted its attention to usage. 89 The principle of the excluded middle
was, for instance, suggested to be untenable as to discourses related
to colors-"yellowish" being not wrecked between the Scylla of
"yellow" and the Charybdis of "not yellow."
So that before providing a frame for studying justice on the model
of mathematical systems, and especially on the model of a logic with
the principle of the excluded middle, it would have been convenient,
89. See section I, D supra.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

or even essential, to ask and answer a number of questions, of which
the following are the most important: (a) Whether or not "justice"
and similar terms have the same meaning coverage at all levels?
(b) Whether "justice" and similar terms tend to become used in the
same way in different cultures and/or in contexts of different ideologies, and/or in different positive institutions? (c) Whether "justice"
predicaments are of the type of "it is yellowish" in some or in all
contexts, and/or levels, so that derivation from a rule is not logically
unambiguous, and the meaning of "equity"90 may correspondingly
vary for some or all contexts and/or levels? (d) Whether rules are
constructions of particular propositions, or vice versa, at the different
levels or contexts?
If these questions are not asked, or if they do not receive certain
kinds of answers, any analysis e la Principia Mathematica must
necessarily leave out those elements of the subject-matter of inquiry
which its framework will not tolerate. In so doing, far from advancing his general analysis of "formal justice," he is cryptically proposing a particular content of justice, insofar as he proceeds on a
kind of reasoning which may be different from that embodied in
usage. Correspondingly, it alters the content wherever the excluded
elements would otherwise suggest the need to modify the conclusions
drawn.
Kelsen probably reached his position via Kantianism, rather than
neo-positivism, as did Perelman. Kelsen's position may thus, as a
priorism, be correspondingly vulnerable to other critiques not here
relevant. Perelman studied mathematics in a period in which the
newer systems were being discovered, but his main study, La Justice,
appeared in 1945, when discussions of the "yellowish" 9' were only
just beginning, and when failure to see their bearings upon his
method of treating problems about "justice" is understandable. Yet
his failure to take stock of them in his later writing of 1957 must be
regarded as a startling example of how a method of inquiry, in one
field, modelled on that in another field, may continue its pretentious
way long after the pretentiousness has disappeared from the model
itself.
Even without confronting the difficulties here raised, Perelman
finally recognized that he was not able to characterize the just actor,
as he had the just action, as a deduction from an applicable rule.
He recognizes that historical experience presents the just agent in
two distinct forms. We consider an actor just who applies the appropriate rule.92 This, of course, raises no difficulty for his theory;
90. As to the sense in which "equity" is here used see suprasection II E.
91. See section I supra, esp. note 22.
92. Perelman, supra note 77, at 355.
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indeed it illustrates the primacy of the rule. But he also has to
recognize that in linguistic usage there is a second kind of "just
actor" who is not "just" simply because he conforms to a rule. This
is the God of the Judaic-Christian tradition, as well as the prophet in
this (as in some other) religious traditions. 93 Conceivably it might
here be argued that in such traditions the actor (God) is the rule;
but this solution would undermine Perelman's theory altogether.
This theory stresses the primacy of the rule in order to show that
statements about justice can be the subject-matter of rational argument. Now, to say God is the rule would be fatal to the main purpose
of the theory, because it would then be necessary to conceive divine
justice as the subject-matter of rational argument. This, however,
Perelman is not prepared to do; on the contrary, he rather acknowledges this conception of justice as Messianic and the concept of God
as the rule as irrational. "On est libre .. .de se soumettre a la justice
divine, mais on est incapable de le comprendre, car elle est rationellement injustifiable; efle ne peut pas guider l'action humaine, elle est
inutilisable dans la vie sociale.' '94 The result, then, is that a particular meaning of "justice"-and one which is likely to be extremely
important-escapes Perelman's systematization. While he admits
that this meaning of justice is important in Western experience, he
can find nothing rational to say about it. And his difficulties with
the ancillary problem of the prophet, that is, of the just actor who
neither conforms to a rule, nor is God, are (if possible) even more
insuperable.
All this is to say that the reduction of justice to conformity to
"rule" is only possible by conscious or unconscious disregard of all
contexts in which justice has no rule-like features. Such a course,
whether consciously or unconsciously entered upon, cannot be merely
an uncommitted onlooker's exercise in historical semantics. It constitutes in itself a theory of justice, justice which tends to be identified,
and (if the quip may be pardoned) not unjustly, with a contentless
legalism. So a study ostensibly concerned with justice, the subject
of men's deepest aspirations and frustrations throughout the ages,
com6s near to deserving the description given by de Bustamante to
Kelsen's theory of law, as "the contentless content of formal juridical logic." Such a description, moreover, flatters a theory of justice
even less than it flatters a theory of law; for, as our fourth section
will show, much can be said for formalizing the language of law,
which cannot sensibly be said for formalizing the language of justice.
93. It is of course even more deeply embedded in non-western experience
and traditions, for instance in the role of the saint in Hindu social and
political tradition.
94. Id. at 360.
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Insofar as that part of justice which Perelman thinks can be the
subject of cogent argument, thus resolves itself into an illustration
of well-known principles of logic, and says nothing specific about
justice as such, this reflects back significantly upon this writer's
attitude to what he terms the formulae of concrete justice. His work
points to the multiplicity and conflict of such formulae, as they are
empirically found, as a reason for seeking a meaning of justice
("formal" justice) which will avoid these difficulties. Each man
insists, he seems to be saying, on pressing that definition of concrete
justice which fits in with his own Weltanschauung; and this results
in conflict and confusion of definitions; whereas if each instead were
content to look merely for a definition of "formal justice," they could
all find themselves in agreement. "The difficulties resulting from
concrete justice do not emerge when formal justice is our only concern.195 The implication is that concern of men with "formal justice" would, in some degree at any rate, contribute to agreement
about the justice with which experience shows that men are concerned.
While the emptiness of Perelman's formal justice, from this aspect,
may meet some needs of an "uncommitted" observer of the human
scene, it says little to the actor or even to the observer himself as a
man about the questions which they try to answer through arguments about justice. Radbruch with his deep and sensitive humanism, recognized the limited significance of the relativist phase of his
thought by proclaiming that our duties as men to take positions on
justice come into play at the very point where intellectual analysis
ends. Perelman, as is perhaps understandable in one whose approach
has been to seek and isolate the area in which cogent argument and
demonstration are possible, seems little concerned with this duty,
and even to reproach us, albeit gently and indulgently, for causing
confusion and conflict by seeking to perform it.
IV. ANALYZING THE LANGUAGE OF JUSTICE AND THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
It has been shown that, as an approach to the problem of understandingabout "justice," Perelman did not choose the path of studying the different semantic shadings that this term has historically
assumed in usage. He engaged instead on the search for a kind of
nucleus of justice, which should be common whatever the usageassociation, and whatever the ideological implications of the usage.
His assumption manifestly was, and it is this type of assumption
rather than any particular writer's indulgence of it, which this article
concerns, that "justice" has a meaning independent of associated
95. PERELAx, DE LA JUSTICE 42 (1945).
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usages or ideologies, that in fact there is some determinate and correct communication when men speak of "justice," whoever speaks,
and whoever listens. For all those who indulge this kind of assumption the problem of "communication" does not involve the problems
of knowing what is the set of experiences or associations for which
in a given speaker's mouth in a given context the symbol "justice"
stands, or of the ideological or psychological implications of particular predications of justice. It is reduced to the problem of what is
analytically implied in using "justice" as a symbol; once so reduced,
this attitude insists, we can always count on getting agreement upon
such a nucleus.
We have seen that in Perelman's case the discovered "nucleus"
which he offers as a contribution towards the problem of better communication about "justice" is nothing more than this: that the
meaning of all statements about "justice" can be ascertained by
translating them into statements at the level of rules, and in particular into statements concerning conformity to rule. And we have also
seen that so far as concerns improving communication about the
concept of "justice," it is highly questionable whether a nucleus
which is unchangeable can be of any utility, at any rate when it is
merely formal. We now turn to a deeper question, and a question
of wider interest for both linguistics and jurisprudence: Is it even
sensible to search for a formal nucleus which shall be essential to
justice, in the sense that it is always implied in predications of justice, regardless of their authors, contents and contexts, and which
therefore can serve to distinguish what is meant by "justice" from
what is meant by all other words? It is a fortunate thing (though
not in the least coincidental) that the question can be given a rather
clear answer, by confronting the language of justice with the language of law.
A. Presence of General Propositionsof PrivilegedStatus
First of all, the language of law is a language such that, at any
rate in our own times, all legal propositions can be conceived to be
general propositions. This is a result of the fact that, in our times,
there is a segment of propositions of law which are both general
in form and privileged. This is only another way of saying that
today, in the usage of most lawyers, a proposition is a proposition of
law if and only if it is either analytically derived from, or it is an
interpretation of certain general propositions of law which are given
95
(as a datum of legal experience) as having privileged status. a
95a. We stress that this and the following discussion concerns the meaning
of the word "law" in the usage of most lawyers, and not either the question
what is an acceptable philosophical conception of "law," or the question what
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The generality of the propositions of law which are privileged may,
of course, be of different degrees. 96 It is taken for granted that the
propositions of a constitution are normally highly generalized; but
even those propositions emerging from a judicial decision which are
privileged (that is, may be thought to be a basis of later decision)
must be general to a degree. For patently, where decisions are
deemed to be such a basis, what is drawn from the prior decision
cannot be a particular proposition, else stare decisis in a system of
precedent would have no conceivable application, the full particularity of each case being unique and never repeated. 97 Insofar as a
ratio decidendi of one case is a basis of decision of a later one, that
ratio must be a general proposition.98 Moreover, the fact that the
standing of an entity as law is referred to a more general proposition is a datum of legal experience; and so is the fact that there is a
level of general propositions which is privileged, to which the standing of other propositions is referred. Both these facts are data of
experience; neither is merely a construction of the analyst. The
language of the law accordingly reflects these facts.
In strong contrast to this, usage presents the language of justice
in the three spheres (which Perelman correctly detects, but assumes
without argument to be "levels") of the just man, just act, just rule,
without any ground in usage for distinguishing any one of them as
privileged. Nor, for that matter, does usage offer any ground for
insisting at all that there must be a privileged level as between them.
All that can be said is that, historically (that is, in the history of
usage), such and such meaning or meanings of "justice" appeared
first of all at the level of "just rules," and then related (but not
identical) meaning or meanings were attached to "justice" as predicated at the level of men, and others at the levels of acts; that
such and such meaning or meanings appeared first at the level of
"just acts," and then related (but not identical) meanings were
attached to "justice" at the level of rules, and the level of men
respectively. And so also with the meaning or meanings which
appeared first of all at the level of "the just man."
In this situation, to speak of levels as privileged may be meaningful
is a true description of law as a social phenomenon. For the first author's

view on these latter (here excluded) questions, reference should be made to
his The Province and Function of Law, esp. chs. 7, 26, 27 (1946).
96. See Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MODERN L. REV. 597,
605-06 (1959).
97. STONE, PROVINCE 188.
98. In the discussions about the "ratio decidendi," (Goodhart, Montrose,
Simpson, Stone) the hypothesis that the authoritative statement could be a
particular proposition, in the sense stated in the first section of this paper, has
not even arisen. See Julius Stone, article cited, esp. 599-600, where the
earlier contributions are cited and discussed.
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in the sense of some logical frame into which the analyst fits them.
But then the privilege arises from the logical frame and not from
the "levels" of justice which we find as a datum of experience.
Further, it may also make sense to speak of privilege as between
the various meanings found within each "level," that is, of just rule,
just act, and just man, if these meanings are subject to a logical
framework supplied by the analysts. But here again the privilege is
a function of the logical frame and not of the meanings as found;
and moreover as between the levels, this would yield even then only
three different versions of the logical framework, one for each
"level," and three different logicized languages of justice corresponding to the versions. These three logicized languages, moreover,
would not be mutually translatable, and their number would multiply according to the number of rival ideologies found within each
of the three spheres.
In short, to logicize the language of justice would but result in
the construction of three different languages and a number of criteria
of interpretation of them, all of them different from the common
usage of the term "justice." For what is found in common usage is
simply an interaction of meanings on one another, as well as an
interaction between statements which, because they are structurally
different, are not mutually translatable. To logicize the language, i.e.,
this fragment of common usage, and split up the products of the
process, is not to study a section of experience as given, but to assert
tacitly how this experience should be reconstructed. It is to advance
a new, if rather arid, ideology of justice. And the same is to be
said of the giving of a privileged status to one of the three spheres
by logicizing the language of discourse concerning them.
B. Identificationof Law and of Justice as a Subject of
Logical Argument
A proposition of law can, for some purposes, be identified in terms
of the arguments supporting its claim to be such. This is because, as
we have seen, some propositions of law are treated as privileged, so
that other propositions can be said to be law only if analytically
derived from, or an interpretation of, the privileged ones.99 To
identify a proposition of law, therefore, it may suffice to state the
privileged norm or norms, and the rules of derivation and interpretation; the privileged norms themselves, in so far as they are not
derived from or otherwise dependent for their indentification on any
other norms, are "primitives." When, on the other hand, we try
99. See N. Bobbio's paper in the section on theory of proof of the Colloque
Internationalde Logique at Brussels, 1953, in Considdrationsintroductives sur
le raisonnementdes juristes, 8 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE PHILOSOPHIE 67 (1954).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL,. 14

to identify a proposition of justice, this method is not available. Any
statement about justice may, in fact, be unrelated in any systematic
way to any other statement; whether in the spheres of just men,
or just acts, or just rules, it may be a primitive statement, quite
independent of all other statements of justice. Nor is there any way
of determining whether a particular statement about justice is a
"primitive" one or not, for even if it were not "primitive," usage
gives us no principles for testing for what it might derive from.
Logic certainly provides no such principles; for, as has just been
seen, "logical" transformations of sentences of justice amount to a
prescription about justice, not to a description of it. One statement
of justice may in usage be "derived" from another in the same or in
different spheres in any of numerous senses, from logical deduction
to the merest association of ideas. To say that the ground of one
statement of justice must be another more general statement of justice, amounts to saying that the language of evaluations in common
usage ought to be reduced to a particular system of formal logic. It
is not in fact so reduced; nor is the tacit assertion that it ought to be
so reduced even a plausible reason for accepting the reduction as in
any way useful.
C. Common Usage, Logical Structuringand Semantic Autonomy
Throughout this article our concern has been to examine what
is conveyed by words, and what inferences from words or structuring of words are legitimate. For this reason we have tried to avoid
(and to make clear that this is so) saying anything about the social
phenomenon some aspects or other of which are associated with the
word "law." For whatever view be taken of this phenomenon, it is
sufficient for our purpose that every lawyer would agree that it
includes a technique of social control, in which an important part
is the formulation of propositions of law, to cope with particular
cases through determined procedures. 10 0 Although the normative
propositions thus formulated must (if, as normally intended, they
are to exercise the function of influencing men's behavior) be
expressed in ordinary language or be translatable into ordinary language propositions, 10 1 it is still a fact that, in modern legal orders,
100. There is a tendency even to appropriate the name "law" to the set of
normative propositions, resolving social control through law into a social
control through words. Glanville Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q.
R.v. 71 (1945), comes nearer this than we believe he intends in saying: "The
law, with its verbal apparatus of 'rights,' 'duties,' and 'wrongs' is merely a
particular application of language as a means of social control." If such a
view is taken by lawyers the analysis hereafter applies a fortiori; we are not
here, therefore, concerned with its tenability.
101. This constitutes the recent theme of U. Scarpelli, "Contributo alla
Semantica del Linguaggio Norm ativo" in MEMORIE DELL' ACADEMIA DELLA
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the formulation of legal normative propositions is arrived at in a
special manner, having little to do with common language.
Below the level of enactment, the normative propositions are the
product of processes of linguistic transformation (i.e., derivation and
interpretation) of the privileged propositions of law above referred
to. The rules of transformation are, to a great extent, predetermined
and fixed.102 These rules of transformation include, first, the enumeration of described situations which are then, for the purposes of
transformation of one proposition to another, substituted for by
specific symbols (e.g., "a transaction," "a corporation," and "a
trustee"). Second, they include the definition of further symbols
which function as linguistic connectives of the law-field ("a right,"
"a duty" and "a power"). The privileged propositions are often
statements about the above-mentioned specific symbols in which
occur the above-mentioned connectives. Broadly speaking, moreover,
we can say that there is a trend to make the language of law as
rigorous as possible, thus promoting legal predictability and certainty at the level of drawing conclusions of law in abstracto (though
obviously this predictability and certainty are not necessarily
achieved at the level of concrete legal applications). And this leads
to the increasing configuration of law as a logical field, which in
turn results in a gradual separation off from within the concept of
law (as a substantive) of "legal" adjectivations used by lawyers,
which also may take the form of the predication of rights, duties,
powers, and so on.
It is necessary to state immediately what is implied in the preceding sentence. As a term used in common language, the word "law"
(which is still in general use in relation to the natural sciences for
describing uniformities of nature) is the name for a rather vague
notion of order and obligatoriness, with fringes of indeterminacy in
the directions of the notion of justice and the notion of empirical
regularity. This is a relic of an earlier historical stage in which
these notions were undifferentiated in the usage of generations
whose tongues as now developed we continue to use. In the special
use of the lawyers, however, "law" has tended to become more and
more the name neither of the above vague notion nor of the specific
technique of social control, but of the sum-total of the "propositions
of law" through which the social control is exercised. This is quite
natural, because these propositions are what lawyers as a group are
mainly concerned with. And it is certainly the word "law" in this
DI ToaiNo, Serie 3a, Tomo 5, Parte II, 4, i (1959). As Scarpelli follows R. M. Hare in this matter (see note 19 supra), what is to be translatable
into common language sentences is, of course, the phrastic.
102. Either by prescription of the particular legal order itself, or according
to the assumption made by those who operate it.
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special use, to which Kelsen's description of "law" is directed. And
it is also to this special use of the word "law," that Perelman's conception of justice approximates.
In these propositions of law, the "legal" adjectivations tend to be
translated into statements in which the above connective symbols,
"a duty," "a right," etc., occur. Thus, there is a correspondence
between the following pairs: "It is legal that I be allowed . . ." and
"I have a (legal) right to . . ."; "It is legal that I be not allowed . .."
and "I have a (legal) duty . . ."; "It is not legal that I be not
allowed . . ." and "I have a (legal) privilege . . ."; and so on. The
difference between the sentences framed in terms merely of what is
"legal," and the sentences in terms of "right," "duty," etc., is that the
latter set of sentences constitutes part of a highly analytic language.
This language is structured on a system of logic, by which from the
primitive (or privileged) propositions of law, discussed in the subsection B above, further propositions can be derived in terms of the
symbols indicated above; or, in other words, by which propositions
of law in terms of the adjective "legal" can be transformed into
propositions of law in terms of such symbols. A sentence in terms
of "rights," "duties," "privileges," and so on is, in fact, a transformation into those more compendious terms of several sentences which
otherwise would have to be fully spelled out in terms of the adjective
"legal,' 10 3 through such connectives as "and" and "not," and related
to each other, not by dint of mutual logical consistency, but by the
actual characteristics of the given positive law. The field of propositions of law, as lawyers talk of "law" in terms of "rights," "duties,"
"privileges," etc., is a special language using special symbols and
structured on logical deduction from the primitive propositions of
law.
Obviously, we are not here saying that the preceding sentences
are an adequate description of the whole process of derivation of
rules by lawyers either on the doctrinal or the juristic level;104 but
they certainly describe an important part of how lawyers think and
talk about "law," even when this does not determine their concrete
decisions. And this is all that is necessary for us to perceive that the
movement of argument from a privileged proposition of law to
what Professor Hart terms "conclusions of law" takes place within
a frame of technicized language of law. 10 5 This is why to talk of
103. And see generally the references to STONE, PROVINCE in the next footnote.
104. See STONE, PROVINCE, pt. 1 passim, paying special attention to the sections beginning on 110-111, 166, 192, and see note 95a.
105. See Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 37

passim (1954). But see note 122 infra as to the phrase "conclusion of law."

We read "draw a conclusion of law" (e.g., at page 49) as meaning "draft a
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"law" in terms of syntactic structures is proper, always assuming
that we intend to use "law" as a term connected with the specific
activity of lawyers, and that the workings of the language of law
are different from those of any other technical language.106
In other words, it is a fact that legal discourse tends to become, in
modern times, more and more a technical discourse. A clear result
of this is that adjectivations in terms of "law," through their translation into sentences in terms of "rights," etc., tend to become (a)
fixed, (b) rigidly defined, and (c) differentiated from each other.
Finally, and in part consequentially, (d) the relations between them
tend to become logical relations. In the result, the word "law" tends
not to be the substantive corresponding to an adjective, but the
label for a field, with a set of logically interrelated substantives in
the place of former law-adj ectivations.
These observations do not apply to the word "justice." It is true
that we indubitably see correspondences between the following pairs:
"It is just that ... "-"I have the legal right of ... "; "It is just that I
be not allowed ... "-"I have a legal privilege ... "; "It is just that I
be allowed to make you do ... "-"I have a legal power . . ."; "It is
just that you be not allowed to make me do . . ."-"I have a legal
immunity . . . ." But in the types of sentence referring to "legal
rights," etc., the meaning receives a predictability and certainly from
the conventional definitions of "rights," etc., and from the logical
relations between this and other legal conceptions, which are simply
not present in the sentences uttered in terms of what is just.
It is true, as seen in section II above, that Perelman's main thesis
conclusion in legal terms"; not as "reach a decision as to the law and its
application."
106. This meaning of the word "law" may also serve to describe law in
general insofar as we think either that the different systems employ the same
symbols or can be significantly described by the use of the same symbols. The
second alternative entails there being a set of symbols such that, certain
axioms being accepted, if we make statements about them every other statement about the actual symbols employed in the different actual legal systems
can be translated into such statements. The relations between these new
symbols would have to be defined, and on the basis of the axioms, it would
have to be possible to develop a perfect language in which the relations between the symbols can be analytically described. These symbols are therefore
variables, and every actual system of law is regarded as a system of interpretation of these variables. Cf. STONE, PRoVINcE, pt. i, especially the sections

beginning at 57, 68, 77, 92, 115.
On the position of Austin, Roguin, Hohfeld and Kelsen in relation to these

"particular" and "universal" positions generally, see STONE, PROVINcE, chs. 2-5,

to which we would here add the riders that perhaps Kelsen's position may not
be as unequivocally "universal" as there suggested. The typical German
allgemeine Rechtslehre of the nineteenth century was of the former nature.
On the other hand, contemporary advocates of Juristische Logik, involving
symbolization of law and the use of a logical calculus of indicatives, (Klug,
Allen, Tammelo), or of modalities (e.g., von Wright) to determine the conditions under which a legal proposition is "true" or "valid," are thinking in the
latter terms.
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is 'that he can make statements about justice which can be agreed
upon whatever be the concrete ideas of justice which are entertained.
'We there showed, however, that the statements offered by him'were
rather statements about the logical relations between a class and a
member of a class, than about justice. We are now in a position to
attempt a more basic diagnosis of what is wrong with his thesis. For
it is now clear that the syntactic structures by reference to which
such agreed statements can be made about "justice" are the syntactic
structures of common language, by reference to which we can also
describe the usage of other abstract terms such as "beauty" and so
on. And statements about "justice" by reference to some syntactic
structures say nothing specific about justice, if the same statements
by reference to the same syntactic structures can also be made about
other abstract terms. On the other hand, as the preceding paragraphs have shown, a description of "law" in terms of syntactic
structures does amount to a specific description of an important part
of the special language-field for which, in lawyers' usage, "law" has
become a comprehensive name.
We can now, perhaps, restate more precisely the gist of the preceding paragraphs. It is possible to substitute the description of a
particular set of operations for terms which are (like the symbol "a
right," etc.) employed as technical terms in a special and logicized
language, or for terms (like "law") which are comprehensive names
for such a language field. This is a consequence, in the former case
("a right"), of the fact that such terms in their technical use have
when isolated no semantic side; they occur as logical connectives in
sentences of the special language. It is a consequence, in the latter
case ("law"), of the fact that the semantic side of the term as an
isolated term is nothing other than the special language-field as a
whole.
While "law" is thus but a comprehensive name of such a special
language-field as a whole, it is clear that "justice" is not. This is the
basic reason why, as already pointed out in subsection B, reference to
terms of arguments and to syntactic structures is useful as an
approach to the determination of the meaning of the word "law," this
being a name for special syntactic structures which permit a special
type of argumentation. Whereas this does not go for "justice," which
neither is the name for a special language-field nor is itself a term
whose meaning is clear only in such a field.
The word "justice" has a semantic autonomy even as an isolated
word,10 7 though of course, liable to change in the course of its history.
It can, in other words, constitute a sentence-word in any of its
107. See ULL AN, SEMANTICS 51 passim (2d ed. 1957).
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meanings. 0 8 This is a characteristic of common language words. The
cry "Justice!" is not only meaningful but reacts with a variety of
meanings according to the factual contexts of the exclamation. It
may mean: "Justice is done"; "Fiatjustitia," "Justice requires it"; "I
want justice"; "I deserve justice"; "How just this man is"; and "It is
just that John gives the money back to Jack." It may even be a
synthetic expression of feeling different in meaning from every
complete sentence. If in meditation we murmur, "Justice! . . .Justice!-. . . Justice!," this word has a meaning other than if we substitute the words "Cheshire cats!" for the word "Justice!"; but it would
still not be the meaning of any complete sentence containing the
word "justice."
"Law" can, in some instances, amount to a sentence-word, just as
can the word "justice"; but its meaning in such sentence-words does
not include the meaning which primarily interests the lawyer, and
which concerns Kelsen's "pure" theory of law. If we hear the cry
"Law!," this utterance can conceivably have a meaning in two sets
of conceivable factual contexts. The first is when we can understand
this exclamation as a response similar to the complete sentence"I speak of justice and you refer to law!"; the second is when we
can understand this utterance as a response similar to the complete
sentence--"This is not law, it is chaos." It is noticeable that in both
of these situations "law" has the fringe meanings associated with
the common usage, one trending towards the coverage of justice, and
the other towards the coverage of empirical regularity.109 In the
first sentence, "law" stands for "legalism"; and in the second sentence
it stands for (or is very akin to) "order" or "regularity."
It is clear that, in these acceptations, where "law" can stand as a
sentence-word, it is a word about which nothing can be said by way
of reference to any special, logically structured language-field. For
the structures in which "law" in these acceptations occurs are the
structures of common language. But in the meaning in which "law"
is the name of such a special language field, to speak of that field is
to say something about "law." The meanings of the word "law"
when this can stand alone as a sentence-word, therefore, cannot be a
basis for understanding either "law" or "justice" in terms of conformity to a rule. For such an understanding, as we have seen, fixes
the meanings of these words in terms of logical structuring of propositions, subordinated to some of them which are privileged (that is
to a special logically structured language field). We can, therefore,
dismiss those meanings of "law" when it is a possible sentence-word,
as quite irrelevant to our present problems.
108. See Graff, The Word and the Sentence, 5
109. See this section, esp. supra p. 373-74.
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To conclude, the language of justice rests on a single, undifferentiated and undefined adjectivation; and (as already observed) the
translation of a statement carrying an adjectivation in terms of justice into another statement also carrying one, may and does take
place even though the two statements are not in the same sphere of
"just acts," or "just men" or "just rules." As also there observed,
transformation may be by a psychological trend, or an association of
ideas, as well as by a predetermined system of logic. The language
of law, on the other hand, includes the use of symbols, each of
defined scope, whose interrelations have been established by a predetermined system of logic; so that propositions containing them are
logically translatable into one another, and reference to some propositions which are privileged establishes the interrelations between
all other propositions. There is, in other words, a special logically
structured language of law; 1 0 there is not such a language of justice. The language of justice remains the common language, and
common language is not structured on a given single system of logic.
D. Should We Merge the Languages of "Law" and "Justice"?
We may end with two further observations. One is that in
language "justice" is connected to "law" in a double way. In some
contexts "justice" is a synonym of "law" or of the legal process.
"Penal justice" may mean "penal law." In such cases the word
"justice" is a homonym, covering both law and justice, but, of course,
the differentiation of the two concepts, stimulated by legal positivism,
is leading to a disuse of this double meaning of "justice." This contemporary differentiation, however, still leaves a true homonymic
clash in the contexts where the word was formerly of clear and single
but undifferentiated meaning. Many positivist assaults on statements
in the older literature treat as homonymical clashes words which in
their contexts were of clear and single but undifferentiated meaning.
Obviously a clash can be said to exist if someone can see a clash.
This is, moreover, another reason for not identifying "justice" and
"law" as two names for the same thing, namely, conformity to rule.
We are not suggesting that such a thing as "justice" and such a thing
as "law" are obviously distinct (as it were, in themselves) as Professor Hart sometimes seems to do in the Fuller-Hart discussion."' We
simply suggest that the very fact that a position like Hart's is taken,
implies that the two concepts have to be distinguished. And this is
so, even for anyone who insists on the old truth now again argued
by Professor Fuller (and others like Villey) that, in the concrete
110. See this section supra passim, especially pp. 372-76.
111. See his Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAHV.
L. REv. 593 passim (1958).
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process of law-application, considerations of "justice" and considerations of "law" cannot always be distinguished. The fact is to be
acknowledged that there may be a logical structure within the framework of which, on the abstract level, conclusions of law are to be
drawn. But this acknowledgement leaves unimpeached the truth
that a proposition drawn through that logical framework, and thus
offering itself for, application as law, is not law on the concrete level
merely because it has been so drawn."2
Secondly, "justice" and "just" occur as terms in legal contexts, and
even in privileged propositions of the law-field. For instance, some
statutes, like the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943,
sections (1), (2) and (3)113 contain the expression 'just." This gives
another reason for distinguishing the language of law from the language of justice. In these contexts, in fact, it is clear that the introduction of "justice" is conditioned by the definition of the limits of its
application, and, within these limits, the reference to justice amounts
to the inclusion within the logical structure of law of an indeterminate standard." 4 In other words, the reference to justice-as to
the "equitg," "equita," "equitable," "equo"" 5 in systems where equity
has not been crystalized into law-marks the boundary where the
judge stops speaking the language of law and begins speaking the
common language (and begins thinking therefore in terms, not of
legal sense, but of common sense).
What is more, the authors of this paper believe that considerations
in terms of "justice" necessarily formulated in common language, as
well as the processes of transformation of sentences containing such
terms, processes ungoverned by any predetermined system of logic,
are ever-present in the operation of law. And when such a term
appears in a sentence, it may have a meaning different from that in
any other sentence, or even context, in which it is found. Such considerations are found, notably (though of course not exclusively) (a)
when the logically ordered body of legal propositions offers com6
peting premises which can all be chosen for the instant problem;"
(b) when the proposition given or chosen as a premise offers, by
112. STONE, PROVINCE 70, 110-111, 192.
113. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts), 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, as to the circumstances in which money can be recovered by or from a party incurring
expenses, or receiving a valuable benefit (respectively), before time of discharge of the contract.
114. Which has long been discussed in common law countries, for instance,
by Pound. See now POUND, JURISPRUDENCE VOL. ii, pp. 127 ff., vol. iv, p. 28, and
his Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HAnv. L. REV. 641 (1923); and see STONE,
PROVINCE 185-86.
115. In civil law eountries there has recently been a considerable amount
of attention directed to these standards. See, for instance, C. M. de Marini,
IL GIUDizio DI EQUITA, PREMESSE TEoRIcHE (1959).
116. STONE, PROVINCE chs. 6, 8; Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22
MODERN L. REV. 598 pdssirk (1959).
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reason of its terms or internal syntactical relations, more than one
solution for the instant problem;" 7 and (c) when the legal order
in which we are operating is not, or is regarded as not, complete." 8
But the fact that the authors reject the view that a definition of law
in terms of special language and logical structuring can be exhaustive, or that it can be a sufficient basis for doctrinal and judicial
development of a legal system, does not prevent us from believing
that such a definition may be useful for some purposes. One of the
purposes for which it is useful is that of enabling us to envisage as
a whole the framework through which lawyers usually process not
only the particular propositions offered as the applicable rules, but
also the fact situations for which they are seeking the applicable
rules. "Law" in these terms refers to the framework and not to the
process." 9 Moreover, the decision reached in the concrete case, while
it must pass through the framework, is also conditioned by the
process. And while the process presupposes the framework, it may
be (and, in our view, often is) the process which has the last word. 120
But what is important for the present article is that Kelsen's theory
of law, and indeed any significant analytical theory of law, can tell
us something about law by telling us about the way in which words
are used in sentences, and how sentences are related to each other, in
the usage of lawyers. The reason for this we have shown to lie in
the fact that the language used by lawyers is a special language, with
its own logical structuring.
It is an important incidental reflection from our study of the language of justice, that we have reached, by a different route, concurrence with the important theme of H. L. A. Hart's distinguished
inaugural lecture of 1953.121 He there addressed himself to "the great
anomaly of legal language-our inability to define its crucial words
in terms of ordinary factual counterparts." And the core of his
117. Stone, works last cited, and see recently L. Bagolini, La Scelta del
Metodo nella Giurisprudenza, 35 RIVISTA INTERNATIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL
The French translation is La Choix de la 7ndthode en
DIRITTo 24 (1958).

Jurisprudence,1 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE 2 (1958).
118. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 869 (rev. ed. 1958);

Stone, Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community,

35 BRiT.

YB. INT'L L.

124 (1959).

119. This does not mean that others, e.g., M. S. McDougal, are not entitled
to attempt to describe this process (or part of it) and to call it "law." It
might even be argued that since it is usually the process which controls the
decisions of concrete cases, the word "law" should be appropriated rather to
this meaning. For reasons which I have stated elsewhere, however, I do not
think it is fruitful to appropriate the word "law" exclusively to any of the
rich variety of aspects of the phenomena to which men may refer when they
use it. What is important is to distinguish the aspect which is for the moment
being talked about.
120. Cf. STONE, PROVINCE 47-52, 137-46, 189-206; and Stone, The Ratio of
the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MODERN L. REV. 598 (1959).
121. Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70 L.Q. REV. 37, 40 passim esp.
41, 43, 54-55n. (1954).
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answer was that legal terms such as "corporation," "a right," etc.,
are not capable of definition in the ordinary way, because their purport is not to describe any factual entity, nor to state any rule of
law. It is rather to figure as part of a statement in which is recorded
the legal effect of the existence of a certain rule in a legal system,
and of a certain state of facts to which this rule applies, and to which
a court has a legal duty to apply it. They are, in the present view,
not part of the process of decision of concrete cases, but are rather
symbols which have a function in statements which record in legal
language a decision which has already been reached, whether a
decision of the whole case itself, or of some intermediate question
which is part of a logical chain leading to it.
This incidental reflection, perhaps, places Professor Hart's theme
in a somewhat broader perspective which was not relevant to his own
subject. The present paper has been concerned to stress that jurisprudence, insofar as it is not limited to analytical jurisprudence, dare
not overlook the distinctive qualities either of common language, or
of the special language of lawyers.1 22 For what its authors deny
above all is the utility of so defining a field-like the justicefield-which is a segment of common language, in terms of a special
language or logical structuring similar to those used by lawyers. Nor
do we think that the presence of considerations of justice (and therefore of common language statements) in the process of the operation
of law, either requires or warrants the attempt to merge two
language-fields so different in structure and so differentiated in usage
as those, respectively, of law and justice.
122. In his brilliantly executed undertaking to address both lawyers and
philosophers, Professor Hart was confronted by even sharper dangers. To
speak with equal clarity to both, especially on an essentially linguistic problem, required perhaps an extraordinary sensitivity to two special languages
(of lawyers and philosophers) as well as to common usage.,

